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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 930286-CA 
v. : 
C. DEAN LARSEN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a jury conviction of theft, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) in 
the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
Michael R. Murphy presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Judge's Hypothetical Comment. Did the trial judge's 
hypothetical oral comment that if he had not arrested judgment he 
would have granted a new trial constitute an order binding upon a 
successor trial judge? Insofar as this issue presents a question 
of law# the trial court's decision is reviewable for correctness. 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
2. Intent to Deprive. Did the trial court err in instructing 
the jury that defendant could be found guilty of theft if he formed 
the purpose to deprive after gaining control of the subject property? 
"Determining the propriety of the instructions submitted to the jury 
presents a question of law, and we therefore review the trial court's 
instructions under a correction of error standard." Ames v. Maas, 
846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993). This Court will "review jury 
instructions in their entirety and will affirm when the jury 
instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the case." State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
3. Good Faith Instruction. Did the trial court err in 
denying defendant's requested good faith instruction whose substance 
was covered by other instructions? See standard of review for issue 
No. 2. 
4. Limited Partnership Property. Is defendant bound by 
this Court's prior consideration and rejection of his claim that he 
is entitled to an acquittal because the property he embezzled belonged 
to the limited partnership, not the limited partners? This issue 
does not require this Court to review any ruling of the trial court. 
5. Prior Conviction of Securities Fraud. Did defendant's 
prior conviction on 18 counts of securities fraud constitute conviction 
of a crime involving "dishonesty or false statement" for purposes 
of rule 609(a)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence? This issue presents a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
at 781 n.3. 
6. Evidence of Motive. Did the trial court abuse its 
discretion in permitting a prosecution witness to testify concerning 
the State's investigation of other securities violations by Granada, 
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Inc.? A trial court's rule 403 ruling will not be disturbed absent 
an abuse of discretion. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 n.3. An appellate 
court will "review the trial court's 403 ruling admitting or denying 
admission to evidence by deciding whether, as a matter of law, the 
trial court's decision that 'the unfairly prejudicial potential of 
the evidence outweighs [or does not outweigh] its probativeness' was 
beyond the limits of reasonability.,f State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 
232, 239-40 (Utah 1992) (bracketed language in original; citation 
omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. Evid. 403: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(2): 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the 
accused has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which the witness 
was convicted, and evidence that an accused has 
been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted 
if the court determines that the probative value 
of admitting this evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it 
involved dishonesty or false statement, regard-
less of the punishment. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with theft, a second degree felony, 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) (R. 1729-30) . After a trial, 
the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged (R. 1876). 
Defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment or, in the 
alternative, for a new trial (R. 1911-12). Judge Russon entered a 
written order arresting judgment on the ground that "the facts proved 
or admitted at trial do not constitute a public offense" (R. 2005-07, 
Addendum B) . He orally commented, "if my ruling had been otherwise, 
I would have granted a new trial ..." (Addendum A at 110). The 
State appealed from the order, and this Court reversed the trial court 
and remanded the case for reinstatement of the jury verdict and 
sentencing. State v. Larsen, 834 P.2d 586, 591-92 (UtahApp.) cert. 
denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992) (Larsen I) (Addendum C). 
On remand, Judge Murphy sentenced defendant to the statutory 
term and imposed restitution in an amount to be determined by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole. He imposed no fine. He 
also stayed defendant's prison sentence and placed him on 36-month 
probation (R. 2277-78). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case were concisely stated by this Court 
in Larsen I, 834 P.2d at 587-88: 
In 1971, defendant formed a corporation known 
as Granada, Inc., which developed real estate 
primarily through the partnerships and limited 
partnerships it created. Defendant served as 
president of Granada and, along with members of 
his family, owned the corporation. 
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In 1979, Granada created Three Crowns Ltd., 
a limited partnership, and sold limited partner-
ship interests to a number of investors. Three 
Crowns then purchased a mobile home park in Las 
Vegas, Nevada. Defendant was one of three 
general partners in Three Crowns and in 1980, 
Granada became the acting general partner. 
In 1986, when Granada began experiencing a 
serious cash flow problem, members of Granada's 
executive committee met regularly to discuss and 
attempt to remedy the problem. The committee 
discussed selling the Three Crowns property, but 
did not decide to sell it. On October 10, 1986, 
defendant sold the property without telling any 
of the members of Granada's executive committee, 
and deposited the proceeds of $1,073,000 into 
the Three Crown's bank account. Defendant drew 
a check for $600,000 on the account, deposited 
it in Granada's Interoffice Account, and 
transferred $500,000 to an account for Utah 
Mortgage Fund, a proposed securities offering 
by Granada that would allow Granada to bring in 
additional investment money. 
By October 23, 1986, defendant had trans-
ferred all the proceeds of the sale of the Three 
Crowns property to Granada's accounts without 
the knowledge either of Granada's executive 
committee members or the limited partners of 
Three Crowns, who were the alleged victims of 
the theft. Granada's books listed the proceeds 
as loans, but no payments were ever made to Three 
Crowns. The State's expert testified at trial 
that in March 1986, Granada was already insolvent 
"to the tune of $20 million," which condition 
worsened with time. 
Limited partners of Three Crowns, including 
Ned Gregerson and Neil Mortenson, learned of the 
sale of the partnership property, asked defendant 
to distribute their shares to them, and instruct-
ed defendant on how they wanted theirs shares 
of the proceeds to be reinvested. Defendant never 
distributed the shares to them. Limited partner 
John Chamberlain requested a cash distribution, 
but only received a lesser valued interest in 
another mobile home park, despite defendant's 
assurances that he would receive the money. 
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Robert Nelson, another limited partner, also did 
not receive a requested distribution. 
In January 1987, Granada's executive 
committee and lower management determined that 
Granada had a negative net worth of between $3 
to $7 million. Granada filed for bankruptcy. 
Defendant then made several disbursements of the 
proceeds from the sale of the Nevada property, 
but none to the limited partners named above. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Judge Russon's comment that he would have ordered a 
new trial had he not arrested judgment did not constitute an order 
binding upon his successor judge for several reasons. First, it is 
apparent on the face of Judge Russon's comment that it is not an order. 
Second, any ambiguity in the trial judge's oral statement was cured 
in his written order, which makes no mention of a new trial. Third, 
Judge Russon's order arresting judgment and purportedly acquitting 
defendant mooted defendant's motion for a new trial and rendered any 
"ruling" on it similarly moot. Fourth, this Court implicitly rejected 
defendant's argument on his first appeal. Finally, on appeal defendant 
does not defend the substance of Judge Russon's comment. 
2. Defendant waived his objection to the jury instruction 
on intent by failing to preserve it below. Nevertheless, the trial 
court properly instructed the jury that defendant could be found guilty 
of theft if he formed the purpose to deprive after gaining control 
of the subject property. Utah's theft statute incorporates numerous 
common law crimes, including embezzlement. The essence of embezzlement 
is that the actor converts property he lawfully acquired. Hence, 
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it is not necessary for a defendant to harbor the intent to deprive 
when he receives the property. 
3. Defendant failed to preserve for appeal his claim based 
on his proffered good faith jury instruction. Moreover, the substance 
of the instruction was thoroughly covered in other jury instructions. 
4. a. Defendant argues in effect that he should have been 
acquitted because the evidence at trial showed that he embezzled 
property belonging to the limited partnership and not to the limited 
partners. In Larsen I, this Court considered and rejected this 
argument. See Larsen 1, 834 P.2d at 590-591. It held that "a partner 
may be convicted of theft of partnership property." Id. at 591. 
It also held, "To obtain a conviction for theft, the State does not 
have to prove who owned the property. . . . Thus, the distinction 
defendant draws between partnership property and the property of 
individual partners is not determinative." Id. (citation omitted). 
Therefore, law of the case and controlling precedent preclude 
relitigating this issue. 
b. Defendant's claim that certain jury instructions should 
have been given fails for four reasons. First, the claim was not 
preserved below. Second, the proposed instructions are not included 
in the record on appeal. Third, the proposed instructions deal with 
the legal status of the limited partnership, which is not at issue 
in this case. And fourth, to the extent they can be understood to 
bear on this case, the instructions incorrectly state the law under 
Larsen_I. 
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5. Defendant's 18 counts of securities fraud were admissible 
for the purpose of impeachment. 
a. Rule 609(a) (2) provides that "evidence that any witness 
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved 
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment." The 
trial court lacks discretion to exclude the evidence. 
b. Also, rule 609(e) states: "The pendency of an appeal 
therefrom does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible." 
c. Finally, defendant's argument that securities fraud is 
not a crime involving dishonesty or false statement fails. The 
unspoken premise of this argument is that misleading an investor by 
omitting a material fact does not implicate one's honesty. No legal 
authority supports this view; common sense belies it. 
6. Defendant failed to properly preserve his objections 
to the testimony of John Baldwin that he now challenges. Mr. Baldwin 
testified that at the time of the embezzlement defendant needed half 
a million dollars in order to issue a securities offering necessary 
to keeping his financial empire operational. On appeal, defendant 
attacks that portion of Mr. Baldwin's testimony regarding the Utah 
Division of Securities' concern that defendant was issuing unregistered 
securities. Because Mr. Baldwin's testimony exposed defendant's motive 
for the theft, it was probative. Conversely, evidence that defendant 
had been investigated for issuing or attempting to issue unregistered 
securities would hardly arouse and inflame the passions of a jury 




THE TRIAL JUDGE'S HYPOTHETICAL ORAL COMMENT 
THAT IF HE HAD NOT ARRESTED JUDGMENT HE WOULD 
HAVE GRANTED A NEW TRIAL DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
AN ORDER BINDING UPON A SUCCESSOR TRIAL JUDGE 
After the jury convicted defendant on the theft charge, 
he moved to arrest judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial. 
Judge Russon granted defendant's motion to arrest judgment on the 
ground that the facts of the case did not constitute theft (Transcript 
dated Feb. 19, 1991 at 109-110) -1 The judge then stated: 
But in addition to that, I do make the following 
finding that in addition to that, if my ruling 
had been otherwise, I would have granted a new 
trial because I don't think the instruction 
clearly outlined that intent as is necessary in 
the element instructions. 
(Id. at 110). The judge later entered a written order, prepared by 
defense counsel, arresting judgment pursuant to rule 23, Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, and purporting to acquit defendant (R. 2005-07, 
Addendum B). The written order omits any reference to the judge's 
comment quoted above. 
The State appealed the order to this Court. In his brief 
on appeal, defendant quoted Judge Russon's comment, calling it "an 
interesting footnote" (Brief of C. Dean Larsen in Larsen I at 23, 
Addendum D) . He did not characterize the comment as an "order." 
Defendant then argued: 
1
 Defendant did not make this transcript a part of the record 
on appeal. The State has copied the relevant pages from its own copy 
and annexed them to this brief as Addendum A. 
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Therefore, if this Court remands this case, 
the proper remedy is not to reinstate the jury 
verdict, but to remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion. 
If such further proceedings are allowed by this 
Court in the lower court, then it is presumed 
Judge Russon (or his successor) will enter an 
order granting the Appellee a new trial based 
upon Judge Russon's comments outlined above. 
(Id. at 23-24) . Without comment on this request, this Court reversed 
and remanded "for reinstatement of the jury verdict and sentencing." 
Larsen I, 834 P.2d at 592. 
On remand, defendant moved to reduce to writing what he 
by then was calling "Judge Leonard H. Russon's Order Granting a New 
Trial" (R. 2210-11). Judge Murphy denied this motion in a signed 
minute entry ruling that Judge Russon's "cryptic statement" was legally 
incorrect and was not the law of the case (R. 2843-44). 
On this second appeal, defendant again asserts that Judge 
Russon's aside was binding upon the trial court (Brief of Appellant 
[hereinafter Br. App.] 12-18) . This argument lacks merit for several 
reasons. 
First, it is apparent on the face of Judge Russon's comment 
that it is not an order. It should be obvious that orders are not 
expressed in the subjunctive mood. The law does not enforce statements 
of what a judge would have done under other circumstances. Here, 
the court's purpose was merely to "catch everyone's eye so that same 
instruction won't be used over again" in the event of retrial (Addendum 
A at 110). Defendant's original description of the comment as a 
"footnote" was thus apt. Defendant's law-of-the-case authorities 
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are inapposite because they presuppose a prior order or ruling of 
the court. See State v. Lamuer, 779 P.2d 1125, 1128-30 (Utah 1989) 
(order admitting evidence) ; Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc. , 
692 P.2d 735, 736 (Uta., 1984) (denial of summary judgment motion); 
Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 43 
(Utah App. 1988) (summary judgment). 
Second, any ambiguity in the trial judge's oral statement 
was cured in his written order, which makes no mention of a new trial. 
Defendant's assertion that Judge Russon "resigned and left the bench 
before entering a written order" (Br. App. 16) contradicts the record. 
Defense counsel prepared a written order, which Judge Russon entered 
(R. 2005-07, Addendum B) . Consequently, defendant's demand that Judge 
Murphy "should have simply reduced Judge Russon's oral ruling to 
writing" (Br. App. 14) rings hollow. 
It is well settled in Utah that a trial court's "written 
judgment supersedes the oral statement of the court." Drurv v. 
Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 75, 415 P.2d 662, 663 n.l (1966) . See also 
State v. Wade, 572 P.2d 398, 399 n.3 (Utah 1977) ("oral statements 
of the trial court are superseded by the written findings, judgment, 
or verdict"), overruled on other grounds. State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 
1226, 1227-28 (Utah 1979) . Assuming an inconsistency between Judge 
Russon's oral statements and his written order, the latter should 
govern, since ,f[o]ral statements of opinion by the trial court 
inconsistent with the findings and conclusions ultimately rendered 
do not affect the final judgment." McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 
11 
311, 320, 241 P.2d 468, 472 (1952). See also Parry v. State, 837 
P.2d 998, 999 (Utah App. 1992) (written judgment controls oral order 
that was ambiguous and therefore legally defective). 
Third, defendant filed a "Motion in Arrest of Judgment, 
or in the Alternative, For New Trial on Theft Conviction" (R. 1911-12) . 
Judge Russon's order arresting judgment and purportedly acquitting 
defendant mooted defendant's motion for a new trial and rendered any 
"ruling" on it similarly moot. See Peay v. Peav, 607 P. 2d 841, 842 
(Utah 1980) (where movant's prayer for relief is fully granted, 
alternative claim is rendered moot); State v. General Oil Co., 22 
Utah 2d 68, 61-62, 448 P.2d 718, 718-19 (1968) (where plaintiff sought 
alternatively new trial or additur, order for new trial mooted 
conditional order for additur). 
Fourth, as outlined above, this Court implicitly rejected 
defendant's argument on his first appeal. Inasmuch as defendant has 
not demonstrated any change in relevant circumstances in the 
intervening period, see Lamper, 779 P.2d at 1129, there is no reason 
for this Court to revisit that holding. 
Finally, on appeal defendant does not defend the substance 
of Judge Russon's comment. Judge Russon would have granted a new 
trial based on his belief that the elements instruction "leaves out 
a very key element and it is the element of intent" (Addendum A at 
107) . However, Judge Murphy later ruled that the elements instruction 
was proper (R. 2843-44), and defendant does not argue otherwise. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
THAT DEFENDANT COULD BE FOUND GUILTY OF THEFT 
IF HE FORMED THE PURPOSE TO DEPRIVE AFTER 
GAINING CONTROL OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
In his Point II.A., defendant claims the trial court 
erroneously instructed the jury in instruction No. 22 that, in order 
to find defendant guilty of theft, it was not necessary that they 
find that he formed a specific intent to deprive another of property 
at the time he first obtained control over it, but that such an intent 
could be found "at any period of time" (Br. App. 18-19). 
In his Point III.B., defendant claims the trial court 
erroneously refused defendant's proffered instruction to the opposite 
effect, i.e., that the intent to steal must coincide with the taking 
(Br. App. 28) . Since these claims are the obverse and converse of 
the same issue, the State will treat them together. 
A. This Claim Was Not Preserved for Appeal. 
Defendant lodged exceptions to instruction No. 22 and the 
Court's refusal to give defendant's proffered instruction on intent 
to steal (R. 2059 at 60, 63) . However, he stated no ground for these 
exceptions (R. 2059 at 60-64) . Defendant's objections were therefore 
insufficient to preserve these issues for appeal. "No party may assign 
as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly 
the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c); State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 
1987). 
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Accordingly, these claims should not be considered on appeal. 
B. This Claim Lacks Merit. 
Were this Court to reach these claims, it would find them 
meritless. Utah's theft statute consolidates under one crime "the 
separate offenses . . . heretofore known as larceny, larceny by trick, 
larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, 
[and] receiving stolen property." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-403 (1990) ; 
State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 472, 473 (Utah App. 1987) (citing same) ; 
UtahCodeAnn. §76-6-401(4) (1990) ("obtain or exercise unauthorized 
control" as used in the theft statute includes conduct "heretofore 
defined or known as common-law . . . embezzlement"). 
The State's theory in this case was that defendant had 
committed the "embezzlement" variation of theft (see State's requested 
instruction at R. 1808). 
At common law, embezzlement consisted of "coming into 
possession of property honestly, 'by virtue of one's trust, ' and then 
converting it to one's own use in violation of that trust." State 
v. Tavlor, 14 Utah 2d 107, 109, 378 P.2d 352, 353 (Utah 1963) (citation 
omitted). In contrast, "[w]here the intent to take the property of 
another is formed before the taking, and is coupled with some deception 
or trick to acquire possession of the property, the crime is not 
embezzlement." Tavlor, 14 Utah 2d at 108, 378 P.2d at 353-54. The 
distinction is one of intent. One commentator on the common law has 
written: 
The bailee who receives possession without 
wrongful intent does not commit trespass by a 
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subsequent fraudulent conversion. His offense 
is embezzlement and his conviction under such 
a charge is proper. But if his original intent 
was fraudulent his conversion is common-law 
larceny. 
Rollin M. Perkins, Perkins on Criminal Law 289-90 (2d ed. 1969). 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized this distinction in State 
v. Snvder, 747 P.2d 417 (Utah 1987) . Snyder was charged with theft 
of funds he acquired from investors in a condominium project. It 
was undisputed that Snyder "lawfully obtained possession of the funds 
of the investors. What was in dispute was the authority defendant 
had to expend the funds entrusted to him." Id. at 419. The supreme 
court affirmed Snyder's conviction on the following reasoning: (1) 
defendant was charged with theft under section 76-6-404; (2) the crime 
of theft includes the common law crime of embezzlement under section 
76-6-401(4); and (3) according to Taylor, common law embezzlement 
was committed "when one entrusted with the property of another 
converted it to his or her own use." 747 P.2d at 419. 
In view of the foregoing, instruction No. 22 properly 
instructed the jury that it was not necessary for a conviction "that 
you find that the Defendant formed such specific intent or purpose 
to deprive at the time that he first obtained control over the property 
of another, but such purpose to deprive may be found at any period 
of time in which the defendant exercised unauthorized control over 
such property" (R. 1862).2 This instruction permitted the jury to 
Jury instruction No. 22 reads in its entirety: 
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convict under either the larceny theory of theft or the embezzlement 
theory of theft. It was therefore a correct statement of the law. 
Under defendant' s proffered instruction, in order to convict 
the jury would have had to find "that the intent to steal existed 
at the time of the taking of the property, and no subsequent felonious 
intent will suffice" (R. 1838).3 Because this instruction would 
In order to convict the defendant of the 
charged offense, you must find that he exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of another 
while acting with the specific intent or purpose 
to deprive the other person of his/her property, 
as defined in these instructions. It is not 
necessary that you find that the Defendant formed 
such specific intent or purpose to deprive at the 
time that he first obtained control over the 
property of another, but such purpose to deprive 
may be found at any period of time in which the 




 Defendant's proffered instruction reads in its entirety: 
In order to convict the Defendant of the crime 
of Theft, it is necessary for you to find that the 
intent to steal existed at the time of the taking 
of the property, and no subsequent felonious intent 
will suffice. 
Therefore, if you find that at the time the 
Defendant C. Dean Larsen is alleged to have obtained 
or exercised unauthorized control over the property 
of John Chamberlain, Ned Gregerson, Robert Nelson, 
and Neil Mortsensen [sic] , he did not have the 
intent to steal their property, no subsequent 
felonious intent will suffice and you must conclude 
that the State has failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the element of intent to commit 
the crime of theft. 
(R. 1838). 
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have limited the crime of theft to the larceny variety, it was an 
incorrect statement of the law. Defendant is not entitled to a jury 
instruction that incorrectly states the law. State v. Larsen, 828 
P.2d487, 495 (UtahApp.), cert, granted, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) . 
Not surprisingly, the authorities defendant cites in support 
of his view are pre-code larceny cases and so inapposite here. See 
Br. App. 19; State v. Shonka, 3 Utah 2d 124, 279 P.2d 711 (1955) 
("grand larceny") ; State v. Allen, 56 Utah 37, 189 P. 84 (1920) (same) ; 
People v. Miller, 4 Utah 410, 11 P. 514 (1886) (same). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
PROFFERED GOOD FAITH INSTRUCTION BECAUSE ITS 
SUBSTANCE WAS ADEQUATELY COVERED BY OTHER 
INSTRUCTIONS 
In his Point III.C., defendant claims the trial court erred 
in refusing his proffered instruction on good faith. Br. App. 29-3 0. 
A. This Claim Was Not Preserved for Appeal. 
Again, although defendant took exception to the Court's 
refusal to give defendant's proffered instruction on good faith, he 
stated no ground (R. 2059 at 64) . His exception was therefore 
insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal under rule 19(c) , Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, it should not be considered. 
B. This Claim Lacks Merit. 
Were this Court to reach this claim, it would find it to 
be without merit. "While a defendant has a right to have his [or 
her] theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and 
understandable way, it is not error to refuse a proposed instruction 
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if the point is properly covered in the other instructions." State 
v. Diaz, 220 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 32 (Utah App. 1993) (citations and 
quotation marks omitted, bracketed language in original). 
Defendant's proffered instruction would have added nothing. 
It would merely have instructed the jury that they could not find 
defendant guilty if his state of mind was one of "honesty of purpose 
or freedom from intention to commit theft" (R. 1842).4 
The issue of honesty of purpose was better covered in 
instructions No. 26 ("It is a defense to a charge of Theft that the 
actor acted in the honest belief that he had the right to exercise 
control over the property as he did") and No. 27 ("It is a defense 
to the crime of Theft that the actor obtained or exercised control 
over the property or service honestly believing that the owner, if 
present, would have consented") (R. 1866-67). 
The issue of "freedom from intention to commit theft" was 
covered, and covered far more extensively than defendant's proffered 
instruction would have done, by instructions No. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 
22, 23, 24, which, read together, instruct the jury that they may 
4
 The proffered instruction reads in its entirety: 
Good faith, as commonly used, means a belief or 
state of mind denoting honesty of purpose or freedom 
from intention to commit theft. 
If the evidence in this case leaves you with 
a reasonable doubt whether the Defendant obtained 
or exercised control over the property of another 
in good faith then you should find the Defendant 
not guilty of Theft. 
(R. 1842). 
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not convict unless they find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
acted with the requisite culpable mental state (see R. 1855, 1856, 
1857, 1858, 1859, 1862, 1863, 1864, Addendum E). 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT HAS ALREADY CONSIDERED AND REJECTED 
DEPENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO AN 
ACQUITTAL BECAUSE THE PROPERTY HE EMBEZZLED 
BELONGED TO THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, NOT THE 
LIMITED PARTNERS 
In Point II.B. defendant argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to show that he exercised unauthorized control over the 
property of the four individuals named in the information and the 
jury instructions (Br. App. 20-26). The gist of this argument is 
that he should have been acquitted because the evidence at trial showed 
that he embezzled property belonging to the limited partnership and 
not to the limited partners. In Point III.A. defendant complains 
that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on this theory (Br. 
App. 26-27). 
A. Law of the Case Bars Defendant's Insufficiency Claim. 
Point II.B. of defendant's brief, setting out his theory 
of limited partnership law as it applies to the crime of theft, is 
a cut-and-paste, virtually verbatim rewrite of his brief to this Court 
in Larsen I (see generally Addendum D).5 
5
 The second and third paragraphs on page 21 of appellant's 
brief are lifted from pages 33-34 of his brief in Larsen I; the third 
paragraph on page 22 is from page 28 of the earlier brief; and the 
last several pages of the argument, pages 23 through 26, are lifted 
whole cloth from pages 27 through 31 of the earlier brief. 
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In Larsen I, this Court considered and rejected this 
argument. See Larsen 1, 834 P. 2d at 590-591. It held that "a partner 
may be convicted of theft of partnership property." Id. at 591. 
It also held that " [t]o obtain a conviction for theft, the State does 
not have to prove who owned the property. . . • Thus, the distinction 
defendant draws between partnership property and the property of 
individual partners is not determinative." Id. (citation omitted) . 
Accordingly, this issue has been finally decided by this 
Court in a prior stage of this litigation. Defendant does not argue 
that any "relevant circumstances change [d] in the intervening period," 
State v. Lamper, 779 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1989), nor have they. 
Defendant does not argue that this Court's resolution of this issue 
in Larsen I was "merely dicta," DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 
P.2d 1000, 1003 (UtahApp. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 
1993) , nor was it. Defendant does not argue that Larsen I was "clearly 
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice," State v. O'Neil, 84 8 
P.2d 694, 697 (UtahApp.) (citations omitted) , cert, denied, 859 P.2d 
585 (Utah 1993), nor would it. Therefore, the doctrine of law of 
the case requires this Court to follow its earlier holding. Lamper, 
779 P.2d at 1129-30; Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc. , 692 
P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984) ; DeBrv, 835 P.2d at 1003; O'Neil, 848 P.2d 
at 697. 
B. The Jury Instruction Claim Is Waived, Barred, 
and Meritless. 
In his Point III.A., defendant attacks the trial court's 
failure to give three of his proposed instructions (Br. App. 26-27) . 
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These instructions were intended to support defendant's theory that, 
even if he did appropriate the money at issue, his act did not legally 
constitute theft. Defendant's jury instruction claim fails for four 
independent reasons. 
First, defendant failed to preserve it by objecting and 
stating a ground for his exception as required by rule 19(c), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See R. 2056 at 59-64. 
Second, two of the three requested instructions at issue 
(see Br. App. 26-27) are not included in the record on appeal. An 
appellate court "will not review the denial of a requested instruction 
unless it is included in the record." State v. Cash, 727 P.2d 218 
(Utah 1986); accord State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Utah 1982) . 
The third was given by the court (R. 1860) , as defendant acknowledges 
(Br. App. 27), and so cannot form the basis for reversal. 
Third, the two instructions that were not given are 
irrelevant. According to defendant's brief, the first states: 
At the time a limited partner becomes entitled 
to receive a distribution from the limited 
partnership, he has the status of, and is 
entitled to all remedies available to, a creditor 
of the limited partnership with respect to the 
distribution. 
(Br. App. 26, emphasis added). According to defendant's brief, the 
second states: 
Where two persons create a relationship of debtor 
and creditor, a failure of one of the parties 
to pay over money in satisfaction of the debt 
does not constitute the crime of theft. 
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(Br. App. 26-27) . At most, these instructions establish that a limited 
partnership cannot be guilty of theft of undistributed proceeds. 
However, this prosecution was not against the limited partnership, 
but against defendant. 
Fourth, to the extent these instructions could be understood 
to touch upon this case, they incorrectly state the law. See Larsen 
I, 834 P.2d at 590-91. A criminal defendant is not entitled to a 
jury instruction that incorrectly states the law. State v. Larsen, 
828 P.2d 487, 495 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1992). 
The trial court properly refused to give the instructions 
at issue. 
POINT V 
BECAUSE SECURITIES FRAUD INVOLVES DISHONESTY 
OR FALSE STATEMENT, DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF 
18 COUNTS OF SECURITIES FRAUD WAS ADMISSIBLE 
UNDER UTAH R. EVID. 609(a)(2) 
Before trial, defendant filed a written motion seeking to 
exclude evidence of his conviction of 18 counts of securities fraud 
(R. 1650-51).6 He cited various grounds, including rule 609, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (id.) . The trial court ruled that "there is 
absolutely no question in my mind but that the prior convictions are 
convictions involving dishonesty and false statement" and that, as 
such, they were automatically admissible under rule 609(a)(2) (R. 
2057 at 5, 7-8). 
6
 Judge Russon presided over both the prior securities fraud 
trial and the theft trial giving rise to this appeal (R. 1650). 
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Given the court's ruling, and as a matter of strategy, 
defendant testified to the convictions on direct examination (R. 2056 
at 92). The examination proceeded as follows: 
Q [Mr. Keller] Now, Mr, Larsen, you have 
been convicted of criminal offenses before, 
correct? 
A [Mr. Larsen] Yes. 
Q What have you been convicted of and 
what is the status of those convictions? 
A There was one trial involving securi-
ties fraud recently of 18 counts of securities 
fraud which conviction was entered. 
Q And what is the present status of that 
conviction? 
A Those are on appeal to the Utah Court 
of Appeals. It is a joint appeal of all 18 
counts from that one trial. 
(R. 2056 at 124) . Defendant now assigns error to the trial court's 
admission of this evidence (Br. App. Point IV).7 
A. The Court Lacked Discretion to Exclude 
Defendant's Securities Fraud Conviction. 
Rule 609(a)(2) provides in pertinent part: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility 
of a witness, 
7
 Defendant's references to due process are free of argument 
and analysis and so add nothing to his claim. See State v. Laffertv, 
749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus granted on other 
grounds. Laffertv v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1556 (10th Cir. 1991) , cert, 
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1942 (1992) ("This Court will not engage in 
constructing arguments out of whole cloth [even] on behalf of 
defendants in capital cases"). 
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(2) evidence that any witness has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it 
involved dishonesty or false statement, regard-
less of the punishment. 
With respect to conviction of crimes involving dishonesty 
or false statement, " [t]he mandatory language of the rule leaves the 
trial court with no discretion to exclude the evidence." State v. 
Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 653 (Utah 1989). Accord State v. Wight, 765 
P.2d 12, 18 (Utah App. 1988) ("If honesty was involved, evidence of 
the prior conviction is automatically admissible under 609(a) (2) ") . 
The ruling of the trial court was thus correct. 
Defendant claims that the trial court here had discretion 
to exclude the evidence because the second trial was "part of the 
same case as the first trial" and had the same case number (Br. App. 
34) .8 
8
 Defendant's argument that the "State should not have been 
able to have it both ways" (Br. App. 33) is ironic considering it 
was defendant who urged the trial court to sever the cases. The trial 
court stated: 
The only argument that would be left to the defense 
would be the argument that Mr. Keller has made, 
"But, Judge, this is related so close and a part 
of basically the same case." But it was the exact 
opposite argument that Mr. Keller made in an 
extensive brief and orally in this courtroom that 
convinced me to sever the cases because they are 
different cases and shouldn't have been filed 
together at all. Should have been filed just as 
separate cases. If I hadn't been convinced of 
that initially, I wouldn't have severed them. 
Because what Judge in the world wants to try five 
different trials, when he can do them all in one? 
So I was very reluctant to do that, but I was 
convinced by the defense that they are separate 
and probably should have even been filed as 
separate cases. 
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Yet defendant gives no authority for his novel view, makes 
no attempt to harmonize it with the plain language of rule 609 (a) (2) , 
and makes no attempt to distinguish the controlling authorities. 
Consequently, this Court should "refuse[] 'to address this issue and 
assume[] the correctness of the trial court's judgment.'" State v. 
Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State v. Dav, 815 
P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991) ) : accord State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 
960, 966 (Utah 1989); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 
1984) ; State v. Reiner, 803 P.2d at 1300, 1301 n.2 (Utah App. 1990) ; 
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 71 n.2 (Utah App. 1990); Utah R. App. 
P. 24(d) (9) . 
Since this claim is neither "warranted by existing law" 
nor "based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse 
existing law," it is frivolous. Utah R. App. P. 33(b). 
B. The Pendency of am Appeal Is Irrelevant. 
Defendant argues that allowing impeachment based on 
convictions then on appeal constituted reversible error (Br. App. 
34-35) . 
Rule 609(e) states: "The pendency of an appeal therefrom 
does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible."9 Defendant 
argues that this rule was not intended to apply "under the 
(R. 2057 at 7). It is defendant who wants it both ways. 
9
 The rule continues: "Evidence of the pendency of an appeal 
is admissible." Evidence of the pendency of the appeal was admitted 
at defendant's trial (R. 2056 at 124). 
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circumstances of this individual case" (Br. App. 35) . Again, defendant 
cites no authority for this claim. 
Since this claim is neither "warranted by existing law" 
nor "based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse 
existing law," it is frivolous. Utah R. App. P. 33(b). 
C. The Crime of Securities Fraud Involves 
Dishonesty or False Statement. 
Defendant argues that his conviction of 18 counts of 
securities fraud does not constitute conviction of a crime involving 
dishonesty or false statement (Br. App. 35-36) . 
For each count on which the jury convicted defendant of 
securities fraud it found that he willfully made " [a]n untrue statement 
of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading" (R. 1255).10 
Pointing to the second branch of this definition, defendant 
argues that the jury may not have found that he made false statements, 
but rather statements which, because he willfully omitted a material 
fact, were misleading (Br. App. 36) . The unspoken premise of this 
argument is that misleading an investor by willfully omitting a 
material fact does not implicate one's honesty. Put more plainly 
still, defendant contends that he committed honest fraud. 
10
 This jury instruction appears in a volume of the record 
currently on file with the Utah Supreme Court in connection with 
defendant's petition for certiorari. For the convenience of this 
Court, it is annexed to this brief as Addendum F. 
26 
Not surprisingly, defendant cites no authority for the 
proposition that securities fraud is not a crime involving dishonesty 
or false statement. Nor should it surprise that fraud is precisely 
the sort of crime to which rule 609(a) (2) was intended to apply: 
By the phrase 'dishonesty and false statement' 
the Conference means crimes such as perjury or 
subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal 
fraud. embezzlement, or false pretense, or any 
other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the 
commission of which involves some element of 
deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing 
on the accused's propensity to testify truthful-
ly. 
Bruce, 779 P.2d at 654 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. 
Smith, 551 F.2d 438, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (in turn quoting H.R. Conf. 
Rep. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
C.C.A.N. 7051, 7098, 7103)). Accord State v. Morrell. 803 P.2d 292, 
294 (Utah Ct. 1990) ("Rule 609(a) (2) was drafted to restrict automatic 
admissibility to those crimes which are committed by means of deceit 
or fraud and thus bear directly on a witness's tendency to offer 
untruthful testimony"). 
Since this claim is neither "warranted by existing law" 
nor "based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse 
existing law," it is frivolous. Utah R. App. P. 33(b). 
POINT VI 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO INTERPOSE TIMELY, 
SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO BALDWIN'S TESTIMONY; 
BUT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ALLOWING IT IN ANY EVENT 
Defendant assigns error to the admission of that portion 
of the testimony of John Baldwin, a prosecution witness, appearing 
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on pages 111 and 112 of the transcript volume designated R. 2057 (Br. 
App. 44-45) . (For the court's reference, the entire direct examination 
of Mr. Baldwin is annexed to this brief as Addendum G.) On appeal, 
defendant asserts that admission of this testimony violated rules 
403 and 404, Utah Rules of Evidence (Br. App. 45)-11 
Mr. Baldwin testified that in 1985 he was with the office 
of the Utah Attorney General, which at that time was concerned about 
Granada, Inc. (R. 2057 at 110-11). His examination continued: 
Q (By Mr. Griffin [the prosecutor] ) : Mr. 
Baldwin, do you recall that one of the issues 
that you were looking at or the division was 
looking at was the sale of unregistered securi-
ties? 
A Yes, that is correct. 
Q Do you recall how that was related to 
Granada? Can you explain that a little? 
A Well, there was, to my recollection, 
several entities which I would recall are 
satellites around Granada. That Granada was an 
operation in which money was going. There were 
other entities in which money was coming and 
going, and that collectively we will refer to 
that group as Granada because that essentially 
was the mother ship. We were again concerned 
that certain of these sales of promissory notes, 
securities, other types of instruments constitut-
ed unregistered securities which had not been 
registered and that was the basis of the 
discussions that we had with Granada. 
11
 Defendant's references to due process are free of argument 
and analysis and so add nothing to his claim. State v. Laffertv. 
749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus granted on other 
grounds, Laffertv v. Cook. 949 F.2d 1546, 1556 (10th Cir. 1991) , cert. 
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1942 (1992) ("This Court will not engage in 
constructing arguments out of whole cloth [even] on behalf of 
defendants in capital cases"). 
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Q Can you recall the magnitude of the 
amount of money that was invested in these 
unregistered securities? 
MR. KELLER: Objection. I think there is an 
improper foundation for that, Your Honor. He 
is asking the witness to recollect something from 
his memory that is specific, and I think it is 
inappropriate. 
THE COURT: That can be answered yes or no, 
if he knows. 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) Do you recall the 
amounts of money that were involved in the 
division's investigation? 
A It was millions of dollars. My 
recollection is, as well as that, in order to 
reconcile the negotiations and to provide an 
offering statement to our satisfaction to keep 
the operation ongoing, that collectively was $15 
million. 
(R. 2057 at 111-12) . Defense counsel later interposed a reB.-erva.Tice 
objection, which was sustained (R. 2057 at 113). After a second 
objection (no ground stated) , the court, outside the presence of the 
jury, inquired as to the relevance of this line of questioning (R. 
2057 at 113-14). 
Its relevance was as follows: Defendant intended to issue 
a new offering, called the Utah Mortgage Fund, for the purpose of 
raising $15 million. His objective in raising the money was twofold: 
first, to keep the Granada-related entities in business; and second, 
through a rescission offering, to make additional disclosures to 
previous investors and to permit them to withdraw their money from 
other Granada entities (R. 2057 at 114, 119-20). 
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The initial question was whether the offering was a security: 
the State believed it was; Granada claimed it was not. However, the 
State's concern ran deeper. Because Granada was known to be strapped 
for cash, the Utah Division of Securities would not permit the offering 
to go forward without an escrow account funded with $500,000 to be 
held against the rescission offering. Defendant met this need for 
cash by diverting proceeds of the sale of Three Crowns Limited 
Partnership--proceeds that defendant was then on trial for embezzling 
(R. 2057 at 114-15). In sum, Baldwin's testimony established 
defendant's motive. 
In addition, the prosecutor argued that "we keep on hearing 
Mr. Keller accuse the State of putting Granada into bankruptcy. The 
jury is entitled to know why the State did that" (R. 2057 at 115) . 
The court ruled that the prosecutor could proceed with the 
examination so long as "we make sure we keep on the track so we don't 
get too far afield" (R. 2057 at 118). 
A. The Rule 404 Claim Was Not Preserved for 
Appeal. 
Other than one foundational objection, defendant interposed 
no contemporaneous objection to the testimony he now challenges on 
appeal, which appears on pages 111 and 112 of the transcript. The 
transcript indicates that defendant did object to testimony appearing 
on page 113 as "irrelevant and immaterial"; the court sustained the 
objection. After defendant's second relevance objection, the court 
held the conference summarized above (R. 2057 at 113) . In the course 
of that conference, on page 117 of the transcript, defendant reasserted 
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his relevance objection and objected for the first time under rule 
403, Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 2057 at 117) . At no time did defendant 
object to any portion of Mr. Baldwin's testimony under rule 404 (R. 
2057 at 108-28). 
"Utah Rule of Evidence 103 (a) requires 'a clear and definite 
objection' at trial to preserve an evidentiary error for appeal." 
State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah) , cert, denied, 493 U.S. 
814 (1989) . Objections to "questions in improper form, assuming facts 
not in evidence, asking for irrelevant and immaterial evidence, and 
asking for evidence which, although relevant, should have been excluded 
under Rule 4 03" are insufficient to preserve a rule 404 issue for 
appeal. State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 495 (Utah App.), cert. 
granted, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). Such objections "do not call 
the court's attention to impermissible character evidence and the 
theory is not clear from the context." Id.12 
Hence, defendant's rule 404 claim was not preserved for 
appeal. 
12
 Even if this Court were the reach the rule 404 issues, it 
would find no merit. Rule 404(b) expressly provides that while 
11
 [e] vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith," it "may . . . be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive . . . " 
The testimony at issue here had little tendency to prove 
that defendant acted in conformity with his bad character, but it 
clearly established his need for immediate cash, and hence his motive 
to embezzle from the limited partnership. "Although a judge has 
discretion in ruling on relevancy, that discretion should be exercised 
with considerable liberality when the issue is motive because a wide 
latitude of evidence is relevant and hence admissible to prove motive." 
State v. Smith, 728 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted) . 
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B. The Rule 403 Claim Was Not Preserved for 
Appeal and It Lacks Merit. 
The testimony at issue here was admitted without objection 
under rule 403 (see R. 2057 at 111-12) . Five transcript pages later, 
defendant objected to subsequent but related testimony under rule 
403. He did not seek a mistrial, a curative instruction, jury 
admonition, or an order to strike the testimony he now challenges 
(R. 2057 at 117). 
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling admitting evidence 
unless "a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record." 
Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1). "Where there [is] no clear or specific 
objection on the basis of character evidence or unfair prejudice and 
the specific ground for objection [is] not clear from the context 
of the question or the testimony, the theory cannot be raised on 
appeal." Larsen, 828 P.2d at 495 (quoting State v. Schreuder. 726 
P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986)) (bracketed language in original).13 
Accordingly, since no timely objection or motion to strike 
appears of record here, defendant cannot raise his rule 4 03 theory 
on appeal. However, should this Court deem defendant's objection 
to relate back to the challenged testimony, it should reject his rule 
4 03 claim as without merit. 
A trial court's rule 403 ruling will not be disturbed absent 
an abuse of discretion. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 
13
 Note that under these authorities, context may substitute 
for a statement of "the specific ground for objection," but not for 
the objection itself. 
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(Utah 1991). An appellate court will "review the trial court's 403 
ruling admitting or denying admission to evidence by deciding whether, 
as a matter of law, the trial court's decision that 'the unfairly 
prejudicial potential of the evidence outweighs [or does not outweigh] 
its probativeness' was beyond the limits of reasonability." State 
v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992) (insertion in original; 
citation omitted). 
Here, as set forth above, John Baldwin's testimony was 
probative of defendant's motive, which in turn was probative of his 
guilt. Obviously, all else being equal, a person whose business empire 
depends upon depositing half a million dollars in an escrow account 
is more likely to embezzle a large amount of money than a person with 
no such need. 
On the other hand, the danger of unfair prejudice here was 
negligible. The advisory committee's note to federal rule 403 states 
in part, "'Unfair prejudice' within this context means an undue 
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though 
not necessarily, an emotional one." 1 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret 
A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 403--3 (1993). That defendant had 
been investigated for issuing or attempting to issue unregistered 
securities is hardly the type of evidence that would present a risk 
"that the jury's passions would be inflamed," State v. Branch, 743 
P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1987) , to such an extent that jurors would decide 
the case on that basis. Moreover, defendant challenges only a fraction 
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of Mr. Baldwin's testimony. Excluding that portion would have had 
little effect on the trial as a whole. 
The trial court's ruling admitting the evidence was safely 
within the "limits of reasonability." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239-40. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the record on appeal and the applicable law, the 
State respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
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placef the normal thing that happens is the partners are 
madder than heck and they sue the general partner 
personally for personal liability for mismanagement, 
probably fraud, seeking tripple damages and that is the 
remedy that comes about. And probably the reason we 
never seek — Probably the reason we have no cases 
presented here of any authority of this constituting a 
crime is because it is always through civilly. But the 
State in this case chose to treat it as a theft and I 
have agonized over it myself. 
There is another problem with this case and it 
is a problem that all of us have overlooked. And if you 
will remember when we put together what I have always 
considered the germ of all the Jury instructions, the key 
to the jury instructions, it is the element instruction, 
the most important one because it is the one that — we 
can tell the Jury a lot of things in instructions. We 
can talk all about different concepts and defenses and 
define "willful intent.M We do all of these things, but 
when we finally come down to the — finally come down to 
the instruction that we know that Jury is going into that 
jury room and that is the one we are going to really live 
by, it is the one that tells the Jury, "Before you can 
convict the defendant you must find each and every one of 
the following," and then we number them 1, 2, 3» 4, 5, 6. 
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And then our paragraph after that says, "If you believe 
that the evidence establishes each and all of the 
foregoing beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to 
find the defendant guilty." 
Mow, the State gave us element instructions, 
Requested Instructions and the defense gave us element 
instructions. And if you will remember, I think we 
merged some things. Some wording was charged. I can't 
remember which of you prepared the new instruction that 
was presented. But the new instruction that was 
presented leaves out a very key element and it is the 
element of intent. 
The instructions that this Court gave stated as 
follows: "Before you can convict the defendant of the 
crime of theft, as alleged in the Information, you must 
find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of 
the foregoing elements of that crime. (1) That the 
defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control (2) 
over the property of John Chamberlain, Med Gregerson, 
Robert Nelson or Neil Mortensen, (3) with a purpose to 
deprive them thereof. (4) On or about October 10 — " 
Wait a minute, I have got the wrong one. I am sorry. 
Let me start over again. I have read from one of your 
Requested instead of the one I gave. 
This is the one the Court gave: "Before you 
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1 I can convict the defendant of the crime of theft as 
2 I alleged in the Information, you must find from the 
3 I evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following 
4 I elements of that crime: (1) that the defendant exercised 
5 I unauthorized control (2) over the property of John 
6 I Chamberlain, Ned Gregereon, Robert Nelson or Neil 
7 J Mortensen (3) with a purpose to deprive them thereof (4) 
8 J on or about October 10, 1986, (5) in Salt Lake County, 
9 I State of Utah (6) and that the value of the said property 
10 exceeded $1,000." 
11 I Then we say, "If you believe that the evidence 
12 I establishes each and all of the foregoing elements beyond 
13 I a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find the 
14 defendant guilty of theft." 
15 I We did not instruct them that he did this with 
16 I intent. 
17 MR. PARRISH: Well, Your Honor, I think you 
18 I did. Element three "with a purpose to deprive them 
19 I thereof." 
20 I THE COURT: That doesn't do it. 
21 I MR. PARRISH: It does because that is the 
22 I middle state for the crime of theft. 
23 THE COURT: No, it isn't. 
24 I MR. PARRISH: It is a specific intent and the 
25 I Courts have interpreted it that way. 
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1 THE COURT: Well, I don't think it does. I 
2 I think you have to instruct them. You have to say 
3 Mintent." 
4 I However, be that as it may, be that as it may, 
5 I I am going to grant the defense's motion. I am going to 
6 I Arrest Judgment. I have never felt good about these 
7 I charges that were brought. I have never felt good during 
8 I the trial as I observed it. 
9 I believe that this is a civil matter. I think 
10 I that the argument that has been made is basically set to 
11 I rest by State vs. Burton. That the facts are somewhat 
12 I similar. That this is really basically a civil matter. 
13 I I don't condone what has been done. I have 
14 I already given Mr. Larsen my lecture when I sentenced him 
15 I on the securities fraud. I still feel that way. I feel 
16 I what was done here was a very bad thing, destructive on 
17 I people, that's morally wrong. But the remedy that exists 
18 I exists in the civil courts for fraud and for civil 
19 I action, and that what has gone on here does not 
20 I constitute theft. I think that is the reason we do not 
21 I find a case anyplace in this United States, or all 50 
22 I states and all the Supreme Courts and Courts of Appeal 
23 I and Federal Courts of Appeal. There is not one case that 
24 I can be brought here to show that these particular facts 
25 I can constitute theft, and I don't believe that they 
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constitute theft in this particular case. So I therefore 
grant the Motion in Arrest of Judgment. 
The State has a right to appeal this by statute 
and I fully expect they will appeal it. But in addition 
to that, I do make the following finding that in addition 
to that, if my ruling had been otherwise, I would have 
granted a new trial because I don't think the instruction 
clearly outlined that intent as is necessary in the 
element instructions. I think you can do something with 
a purpose but I am not sure that that constitutes intent 
as required by the statute and defined earlier in the 
statute of a specific intent to deprive. And 1 may be 
wrong in that, but that would be the second prong and I 
only mention that because if this does go on appeal, Mr. 
Parrish, you should be able to appeal that as well. 
MR. PARRISH: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So that if it is reversed, when it 
comes back that will catch everyone's eye so that same 
instruction won't be used over again. And then you try 
it again, and then you end up going back to the Court of 
Appeals again. That is a waste of resources and 
everyone's time. So that is the reason I am ruling in 
that regard. Okay, anything further? 
MR. KELLER: Your Honor, there is one 
additional procedural element under Rule 23. Will the 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OO0OO— 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
C. DEAN LARSEN, 
Defendant. 
—ooOoo 
The above-entitled natter came before me, the Honorable Leonard 
H. Russon, on February 19, 1991, for hearing on Defendant's Motion 
to Arrest Judgment pursuant to Rule 23 U.R.Cr.P. or in the 
alternative for a new trial pursuant to Rule 24 U.R.Cr.P. The State 
was represented by Robert N. Parrish, Esq., and Defendant was present 
and represented by his attorney, Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
The Motions aforementioned were made with respect to the charge 
of Theft, one of 42 charges contained in the Information originally 
filed in the above-entitled matter, and which was tried before the 
Court December 4 through 13, 1990. Said trial resulted in a jury 
ORDER ARRESTING JUDGMENT 
AND ENTERING JUDGMENT OF 
ACQUITTAL 
Case No. 891900927 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
1 
oortoos 
verdict of guilty. This Court set the date of February 19, 1991, 
for potential sentencing on the Theft conviction as well as the 
hearing on Defendant Larsen9s Motions aforementioned. After 
reviewing memoranda of counsel, hearing oral arguments related to 
the aforementioned Motions, and good cause appearing, this Court 
finds that the facts proved or admitted at trial do not constitute 
a public offense; and therefore good cause exists to arrest judgment 
in the above-entitled matter and enter a judgment of acquittal. 
Specifically, the Court finds that the facts proved at trial, 
may conceivably give rise to civil liability on the part of the 
Defendant, but such facts do not constitute the public offense of 
Theft as contained in the Amended Information or any other public 
offense. 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The Court declines to enter judgment on the jury verdict 
of guilty of Theft as contained in the Amended Information and 
arrests judgment in this matter pursuant to Rule 23 U.R.Cr.P.; 
2. The Court enters a judgment of acquittal In favor of 
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provides: "A contract for tale of goods 
may be made in any manner sufficient to 
show agreement, including eonduet by 
both parti* which recognizes the exist-
enee of euch a contract" te (emphasis 
added). 
[4] Specifically, Hughes contends th*t 
the following conduct established a coi*. 
tract between Hughes and Quintek: (1) J*, 
eobsen went to Hughes and requested a 
contract, (2) Hughes prepared a supplier's 
agreement based on the terms of Quintek1* 
bid, (3) Hughes delivered the supplier's 
agreement to Quintek, (4) Hughes gave 
Quintek a single set of plans, (5) Quintek 
maintained a progress log for the project, 
(6) Quintek delivered a single shop drawing 
to Hughes, and (7) Hughes and Quintek 
maintained commuwcsti&jy regarding the 
design of the trusses. 
The above conduct is no more indicative 
of the parties' mutual recognition of a con-
tract than it is of the parties' concerted 
efforts to reach an agreement for the sup. 
ply of trusses for the project Further 
more, Hughes ignores critical facts that 
demonstrate that Quintek never acknow}. 
edged the existence of a contract Specifi-
cally, Hughes overlooks the fact that Quin-
tek rejected Hughes's supplier's agree-
ment; that Quintek did not begin fabricat-
ing the trusses; and that Quintek, in Feb. 
ruary 1984, attempted to make a new offer 
to supply the trusses for the project Be. 
cause the conduct of Quintek and Hughes 
does not demonstrate the recognition of * 
contract as required by section 70A-2-
204(1), we conclude that a contract was not 
formed under that section. 
Therefore, because Hughes has failed t<> 
establish an underlying agreement pursu. 
ant to section 70A-2-204U), we cannot 
reach Hughes's section 70A-2-207 argu. 
ment relating to different and additional 
terms.1 
X Even were we to reach Hughes's section TQAv 
2-207 daim, Hughes's delivery of the supplier** 
agreement would not operate as a valid accept, 
ance under that taction. That section invali. 
states an acceptance if it I s expressly madt 
conditional on assent to the additional terms,w 
The evidence at trial was that when Hughe* 
delivered the supplier's agreement to Jacobean, 
ni. CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly determined that 
no contract existed between Hughes and 
Quintek since there was never a meeting of 
the minds between the parties as to the 
material terms of the contract According-
ly, we affirm the trial court's ruling that no 
contract existed between Hughes and Quin-
tek. 
BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
[O IttTMUMItRSYSTiM, 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
C Dean LARSEN, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. f 10243-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 5, 1992. 
General partner was charged with 
theft of partnership property, and the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Leonard H. Ruason, J., granted defendant's 
motion for arrest of judgment and entry of 
Judgment of acquittal. The Court of Ap-
peals, Bench, PJ., held that (1) trial 
court's ruling waa arrest of judgment, and 
not acquittal, that state had right to appeal; 
(2) partner may be convicted of theft of 
partnership property, and (8) whether gen-
eral partner had exercised unauthorized 
control over partnership property which he 
secretly told was question for jury. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Hughes told him that If he was going » do the 
job, he would have to sign that agreement 
Since Hughes's acceptance was conditioned on 
assent to the additional or different terms con-
tained in the supplier's agreement, the agree-
ment did not constitute a valid acceptance to 
Quintek's offer under that section. 
STATE v. 
L Criminal U w #»1024(5) 
State may not appeal valid acquittal no 
natter how overwhelming the evidence 
against defendant may be. U.CA.1953, 
TM8a-l. 
1 Criminal U w e»1024(l) 
Court of Appeals looks to substance of 
tower court's riding, and not to the label 
attached by judge, to determine whether 
ruling is one that state may appeal. 
U.CJL1953, 77-18a-l. 
I Criminal Law *»1024(5) 
Ruling that constitutes a factual reso-
lution in favor of defendant on one or more 
dements of offense charged is an "acquit-
tal," which state may not appeal. U.CA. 
1953, 77-18a-l. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Criminal U w *»977(1) 
Trial judge may not enter judgment of 
acquittal following jury verdict of guilty; 
in case submitted to jury, only the jury 
may acquit 
I Criminal Law *»975, 977(1), 1024(4) 
Trial judge's postverdict ruling, that 
facts proved did not constitute a public 
offense, was in nature of an "arrest of 
judgment" and not a "judgment of acquit-
tal," so that state could appeal trial court's 
ruling. U.CJL1953, 77-18a-l. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
1 Criminal Law *»5 
Power to define crimes is vested in 
legislature. 
7. Larceny *»7 
Partner may be convicted of theft of 
partnership property even though, aa part-
ser, he is co-owner of property taken. 
U.CJL1958, 76-6-404. 
1 Larceny *»7 
To obtain conviction for theft, state 
does not have to prove who owned proper-
ty, but only that accused obtained or exer-
cised unauthorized eontrol over property of 
"other. U.OA.1958, 76-*4©4. 
LARSEN Utah 587 
>(lte*App. 1912) 
t. Criminal U w *»43 
Existence of civil remedy does not ex-
cuse criminal conduct 
10. Larceny *»6SU) 
Whether general partner had exercised 
"unauthorized control9' over partnership 
property by secretly selling it without in-
forming other partners waa question for 
jury in theft prosecution. 
R. Paul Van Dam and David B. Thomp-
son, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appel-
lant 
Larry R. Keller, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellee. 
Before BENCH, GARFF, and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
The State appeals from an "Order Ar-
resting Judgment and Entering Judgment 
of Acquittal" after a jury found the defen-
dant guilty of theft in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990). We reverse 
and remand for reinstatement of the guilty 
verdict and imposition of sentence. 
FACTS 
In 1971, defendant formed a corporation 
known as Granada, Inc., which developed 
real estate primarily through the partner-
ships and limited partnerships it created. 
Defendant served as president of Granada 
and, along with members of his family, 
owned the corporation. 
In 1979, Granada created Three Crowns 
Ltd., a limited partnerahip, and sold limited 
partnership interests to a number of inves-
tors. Three Crowns then purchased a mo-
bile home park in Las Vegaa, Nevada. De-
fendant waa one of three general partners 
in Three Crowns and in 1980, Granada be-
came the acting general partner. 
In 1986, when Granada began experienc-
ing a aerioua caah flow problem, members 
of Granada's executive committee met reg-
ularly to discuss and attempt to remedy the 
problem. The committee discussed selling 
& 
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the Three Crowns property, but did not 
decide to sell i t On October 10, 1986, 
defendant sold the property without telling 
any of the members of Granada's executive 
committee, and deposited the proceeds of 
$1,073,000 into the Three Crown's bank 
account Defendant drew a check for 
$600,000 on the account, deposited it in 
Granada's Interoffice Account, and trans-
ferred $500,000 to an account for Utah 
Mortgage Fund, a proposed securities of-
fering by Granada that would allow Grana-
da to bring in additional investment money. 
By October 23, 1986, defendant had 
transferred all the proceeds of the sale of 
the Three Crowns property to Granada's 
accounts without the knowledge either of 
Granada's executive committee members or 
the limited partners of Three Crowns, who 
were the alleged victims of the theft. Gra-
nada's books listed the proceeds as loans, 
but no payments were ever made to Three 
Crowns. The State's expert testified at 
trial that in March 1986, Granada was al-
ready insolvent "to the tune of $20 mil-
lion," which condition worsened with time. 
Limited partners of Three Crowns, in-
cluding Ned Gregerson and Neil Morten-
son, learned of the sale of the partnership 
property, asked defendant to distribute 
their shares to them, and instructed defen-
dant on how they wanted their shares of 
the proceeds to be reinvested. Defendant 
never distributed the shares to them. Lim-
ited partner John Chamberlain requested a 
cash distribution, but only received a lesser 
valued interest in another mobile home 
park, despite defendant's assurances that 
he would receive the money. Robert Nel-
son, another limited partner, also did not 
receive a requested distribution. 
In January 1987, Granada's executive 
committee and lower management deter-
mined that Granada had a negative net 
worth of between $8 to $7 million. Grana-
da filed for bankruptcy. Defendant then 
made several disbursements of the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the Nevada proper-
ty, but none to the limited partners named 
above. 
Defendant was charged with theft for 
"txerds[ing] unauthorized control over the 
property of John Chamberlain, Ned Greger-
son, Robert Nelson, Neil Mortenson, tad 
others with a purpose to deprive them 
thereof." At the close of the State's esse, 
defendant moved to dismiss the charge on 
the grounds the facts proved did not consti-
tute a public offense. The trial court de-
nied the motion and defendant proceeded 
with his case. At the close of all the evi-
dence, the defendant again moved to dis-
miss or, in the alternative, for a directed 
verdict, arguing that the facts proved did 
not constitute a public offense. Once 
again, the court denied defendant's motion. 
Finally, after the jury returned a guilty 
verdict, defendant filed a "Motion in Arrest 
of Judgment, or in the Alternative, for 
New Trial on Theft Conviction." The trial 
court granted the motion to arrest judg-
ment and entered a judgment of acquittal. 
On appeal, the State contends the trial 
court erred in concluding the facts proved 
at trial did not constitute a public offense 
and in ordering an arrest of judgment on 
that basis. Defendant disagrees and fur-
ther argues that because the trial court 
entered a judgment of acquittal, the State 
may not appeal. 
STATE'S RIGHT TO APPEAL 
[1] Utah Code Ann. f 77-18a-l (Supp 
1991) "delineates a narrow category of 
cases in which the prosecution may take an 
appeal." State v. Waddoups, 712 P.2d 223, 
224 (Utah 1985); accord State v. Amador, 
804 P.2d 1283,1284 (Utah App.1990). Tte 
State may appeal from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecu-
tion because of a finding of double jeop-
ardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding s 
statute or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a 
-pretrial motion to auppress evidence 
when upon a petition for review the ap-
pellate court decides that the appeal 
would be in the interest of justice; or 
STATE v. 
(f) an order of the court granting a 
notion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no 
contest 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2). The State, 
however, may not appeal a valid acquittal 
"DO matter how overwhelming the evidence 
against the defendant may be." State v. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 
1988). 
[2] The trial court's ruling was entitled 
"Order Arresting Judgment and Entering 
Judgment of Acquittal/1 To determine 
whether a ruling is one that the State may 
appeal under section 7?-18a-l(2), "we look 
to the substance of the ruling and not to 
ft]he label attached . . . by a trial judge/" 
State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198, 1202 
(Utah App.) (quoting Musselman, 667 P.2d 
st 1064), cert granted, 817 PJ5d 827 (Utah 
1991); see also State v. Willard, 801 P.2d 
189, 191 (Utah App.1990). 
[3,41 There is an acquittal if the pros-
ecution resulted in a finding of not guilty 
by the trier of facts or in a determination 
that there was insufficient evidence to war-
rant conviction/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
403(2) (1990). Thus, a ruling that consti-
tutes "a factual resolution in favor of the 
defendant on one or more of the elements 
of the offense charged is an acquittal/' 
Musselman, 667 P»2d at 1064; see also 
Willard, 801 P.2d at 191. An acquittal is 
based on an assessment of the evidence, 
and in a jury trial, "[i)t is within the exclu-
sive province of the jury to judge the credi-
bility of the witness and the weight of the 
evidence." State «. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 
97 (Utah 1982). Therefore, in a case sub-
mitted to a jury, only the jury may acquit 
the defendant 
In Utah, a judge may not acquit a defen-
dant after a jury returns a guilty verdict1 
Utah rules provide that a judge may issue 
an order dismissing an information or in* 
dkrtment "[*}t the conclusion of the evi-
dence by the prosecution, or at the condu-
it tide 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Prc-
eadure allows a federal judge to ester a judg-
ment of acquittal following a jury verdict of 
Suflty. See United Sum v. Martin Linen Supply 
C*. 430 VS. 564,565-66, 97 S.Ct 1349,1351-52, 
51 LExUd 642 (1977). Hie federal scheme alio 
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sion of all the evidence, . . . [if] the evi-
dence is not legally sufficient to establish 
the offense charged therein or any lesser 
included offense." Utah RCrimP. 17(o). 
The rules also allow a judge to arrest judg-
ment at any time prior to sentencing. 
Utah R.Crim.P. 23. There is no rule, how-
ever, that allows a judge, who is not the 
trier of fact, to acquit a defendant follow-
ing a jury verdict of guilty. 
In State v. Myers, 606 P.2d 250, 251 
(Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court stat-
ed: "When there has been a trial by jury, 
the state, as well as the defendant, is enti-
tled to the benefit of the findings and the 
verdict of the jury/' Id. at 251. In Myers, 
the supreme court reinstated the jury's 
guilty verdict after concluding the trial 
court improperly invaded the province of 
the jury by arresting judgment based on its 
own weighing of the evidence. Id at 252-
53. Only where the trial court is the fact-
finder does its assessment of the evidence 
amount to an acquittal, and the State may 
not appeal in that situation. See Willard, 
801 P.2d at 191-42 (in a bench trial, a trial 
court's order based on its assessment of 
the sufficiency of the evidence is an acquit-
tal). 
An arrest of judgment is based on a 
finding that the facts proved do not consti-
tute a public offense. Under common law 
and the federal rule, "a judgment can be 
arrested only on the basis of error appear-
ing on the 'face of the record,' and not on 
the basis of proof offered at trial/' United 
States v. Sisson, 899 U.S. 267,281,90 S.Ct 
2117, 2125, 26 L.EcL2d 608 (1970). The 
Utah rule is not as limiting and requires a 
trial court to "arrest judgment if the facts 
proved or admitted do not constitute a pub-
lic offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, 
or there is other good cause for the arrest 
of judgment" Utah R.Crim.P. 23. The 
Utah rule allows a judge to look beyond the 
face of the record at the facts actually 
proved or admitted in determining whether 
provides that the government may appeal from 
a judge-entered acquittal following a Jury ver-
dict of guilty, pursuant to 18 US.C f 3731. 
United States v. Wilson, 420 VS. 332,352-53,95 
&CL 1013, 1026, 43 L£d2d 232 (1975). 
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the alleged conduct was prohibited. See 
Workman, 806 P.2d at 1202. But $ee 
State v. Owens, 758 P.2d 876, 978 (Utah 
App.1988) (suggesting Utah rule does not 
allow the trial court to go beyond the face 
of the record to consider "proof offered or 
adduced at trial"). 
15] We conclude Hie trial court's ruling 
in this case was an arrest of judgment and 
not an acquittal. The trial court arrested 
judgment, finding that the facts proved did 
not constitute a public offense because the 
defendant, a general partner, could not 
have committed theft by taking partnership 
property. Although the trial court's order 
was also labeled an acquittal, the order was 
not based on a finding of insufficient evi-
dence. In denying defendant's motion to 
dismiss at the close of the prosecution's 
case, the trial court specifically stated that 
it found there was sufficient evidence. The 
trial court again found the evidence suffi-
cient when it denied defendant's motion to 
dismiss at the close of all the evidence. In 
any event, after a jury verdict of guilty is 
entered, the trial court may not acquit 
"Because the trial court's ruling was an 
arrest of judgment, and not an acquittal, 
the State has a right to appeal. 
THEFT OF PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY 
The State contends the trial court erred 
in concluding the facts proved or admitted 
at trial do not constitute a public offense. 
Defendant responds that the trial court's 
action was proper because the State ad-
vances a unique or novel theory in prose-
cuting defendant for theft, and the proper 
remedy for defendant's actions exists in 
the civil arena. 
Ml *TTJhe power to define Crimes . . . is 
vested in the legislature." State v. Often, 
757 P^d 482, 468 (Utah 1988). "In the 
absence of a legislative expression to the 
contrary, courts have ordinarily held that a 
partner cannot be guilty of larceny for 
misappropriating firm property, with any 
such defalcations left for resolution in the 
civil arena." Peoplev.Zinke,UK.YM&, 
2. Model Penal Code § 223^7) defino-proper. 
ty of another" to include "property in which any 
person other than the actor has an interest 
656 N.Y-S^d 11, 18, 555 N.E.2d 263, 265 
(1990). The common-law theory is that be-
cause partners are co-owners of partner-
ship property, they cannot misappropriate 
what is already theirs. Id; Patterson v. 
Bogan, 261 S.C. 87, 198 S.EJM 586, 588 
(1973); State v. Birch, 86 WasLApp. 405, 
675 PM 246, 248 (1984) (legislatively over-
ruled—theft of partnership property is now 
a crime in Washington, State v. Webb, 64 
Wash App. 480, 824 P.2d 1257,1263 (Wash. 
App.1992)); Jane M. Draper, Annotation, 
Embezzlement, Larceny, False Pretenses, 
or Allied Criminal Fraud by a Partner, 
82 AJLR.3d 822, 825 (1978). 
[7] The Utah legislature has chosen to 
abandon the common-law theory. Utah 
Code Ann. { 76-6-404 (1990) states: "A 
person commits theft if he obtains or exer-
cises unauthorized control over the proper-
ty of another with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof." Utah's theft statute further pro-
vides that 'fijt is no defense under this 
part that the actor has an interest in the 
property or service stolen if another per-
son also has an interest that the actor is 
not entitled to infringe." Utah Code Ann. 
{ 76-6-402(2) (1990) (emphasis added). 
One commentator has explained how sub-
eection 76-6-402(2) applies to theft of part-
nership property: 
Under subparagraph (2), one may be 
prosecuted for theft if he takes the prop-
erty of another, although the actor hsd 
an interest in it For example, if a mem-
ber of a partnership withdraws, without 
the consent of the other, money from the 
partnership account so as to infringe 
mpon the tights of the other partner, 
such withdrawal could constitute theft, 
although the actor had an interest in the 
account 
Jay V. Barney, Utah Criminal Code Cm-
mentary 185 (1967), (found in Loren Dale 
Martin, Utah Criminal Code Ouilme 
(W78)). 
In taking this approach, Utah has fol-
lowed the Model Penal Code.1 The com-
which the actor is not privileged to tefrinr 
regardless of the fact that the actor also bst an 
interest in the property." 
STATE v. 
CteMSMPJdSS 
Bents to the Model Penal Code explain that 
the "comprehensive definition of 'property9 
s intended to abrogate whatever still sur-
vives of the artificial common-law restric-
tion* on the scope of larceny and the other 
theft offenses/' Model Penal Code f 223.2 
comment S (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980); see also Draper, 82 
AUlSd at 827; 2 Wayne R. LaFave & 
Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Crimi-
nal Law § 8.4, n. 88 and accompanying 
text (1986). Therefore, under the language 
of the Utah statute and the Model Penal 
Code, s partner may be convicted of theft 
of partnership property.1 See Model Penal 
Code (223.2 comment 4; Wharton's 
Criminal Law, { 419 and n. 45 (1980). 
Defendant contends that even if Utah 
hw is such that a partner may be convicted 
for theft of partnership property, he was 
sot charged with theft of partnership prop-
erty, but with taking the property of four 
individual partners, and because the part-
ners have a remedy in the form of a civil 
tctkm, criminal prosecution is precluded. 
We disagree. 
[8] To obtain a conviction for theft, the 
State does not have to prove who owned 
the property. The State must prove "only 
Ait the accused obtained or exercised un-
authorized control over the 'property of 
another.'" State v. Simmons, 578 P»2d 
141,843 (Utah 1977). Thus, the distinction 
defendant draws between partnership prop-
erty and the property of individual partners 
ii not determinative. 
[I] In addition, the Utah Supreme 
Court has indicated that the existence of a 
civil remedy does not excuse criminal con-
duct See State v. Walton, 646 ?J2d 689, 
01 (Utah 1982). Defendant nevertheless 
relies upon this court's decision in State v. 
Burton, 800 PJW 817 (Utah App.1990) for 
the proposition that if there is a civil reme-
dy, aWinal prosecution is precluded Bur-
ttm does not so bold. In Burton, we 
a Other jurisdictions also provide thsts partner 
any be convicted for theft of partnership prop-
erty. S* «*, HopU v. Sobuk, 30 CaLApp M 
4SI, 106 CaLRptr. 319. 525-26, cert M M 414 
US. 855,94 S.0.155, 31 L&&2d 104 (1973) ("ft 
is both illogical and unreasonable to hold that a 
partner cannot steal from his partners merely 
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found, as a matter of law, that a contract 
between Burton and Waldron imposed no 
legal duty upon Burton to use the specific 
funds he received from Waldron to pay the 
bank. Id at 819. Therefore, we reversed 
Burton's theft conviction because there 
was no legal basis for finding that Burton 
exercised "unauthorized control" over the 
funds paid by Waldron to Burton. We 
then indicated that a chrfl action was tradi-
tionally viewed as an adequate remedy in 
such cases. See idL 
[10] In the present case, the trial court 
relied on Burton, finding that although 
"the facts proved at trial may conceivably 
give rise to civil liability, . . . such facts do 
not constitute the public offense of theft" 
In contrast to Burton, this defendant was 
not authorized as a matter of law to deal 
with partnership property as he wished. 
Although the partnership agreement grant-
ed the general partners numerous powers, 
it contained the limitation that a general 
partner exercise those powers only in the 
best interests of the partnership. The 
agreement did not authorize defendant to 
deal with partnership property in a manner 
that he knew was not in the partnership's 
best interests. Therefore, in this case, 
there was a legal basis for finding "unau-
thorized control/' and it was for the jury to 
decide whether a theft was committed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that 
under Utah's statutory scheme, a partner 
may be convicted of theft for exercising 
unauthorized control over partnership prop-
erty and that Burton does not preclude 
criminal liability in this case. Therefore, 
we conclude, the trial court erred in deter-
mining the facts proved at trial do not 
constitute a public offense, and in arresting 
judgment on that basis. Accordingly, we 
because be has an undivided interest in the 
partnership property. Fundamentally, stealing 
that portion of the partners' shares which does 
not belong to the thief is no different from 
stealing the property of any other person."); 
Suae v. Si*% 197 Neb. SI, 24S N.W d^ 1, 6 
(1976); Webb, S24 ?2d at 1263. 
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reverse and remand for reinstatement of 
the jury verdict and sentencing. 
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur. 
ft fmitpiMi SYSTEM! 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Todd Allen PARKER, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. M0265-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 12, 1992. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. 
Wilkinson, J., of burglary of a dwelling, 
and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Russon, J., held that police lacked required 
probable cause to arrest him so that his 
subsequent statements had to be sup-
pressed. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Automobiles #»M9(2) 
Reasonableness of traffic stop, which 
is limited seizure and more like investiga-
tive detention than custodial arrest* is as-
sessed under principles governing investi-
gative detentions based on whether offi-
cer's action was justified in it inception and 
whether action was reasonably related in 
scope to circumstances which justified ini-
tial interference. U&&A. ConstAmends. 
4 ,5 . 
2. Automobiles **4K2) 
Officer had justification for initial atop 
of defendant where defendant was driving 
45 miles per hour in 25-mile per hour acne. 
S. Automobiles **4»(8) 
While police officer had discretion to 
atop defendant for traffic violation, arrest 
tor burglary was not based on reasonable 
articulated suspicion where, at time of stop, 
only fact that tied defendant to burglaries 
Was presence of vehicle he was driving m 
%rea near where crime occurred; presence 
of vehicle, without more, did not give rise 
to reasonable suspicion. 
4. Automobiles e»349(15) 
Police officer did not have discretion to 
Remove defendant from his vehicle, hand-
tuff him, and place him under arrest after 
Witnessing defendant exceed speed limit 
While entering driveway absent any reason-
able articulable suspicion that defendant 
Was involved in earlier burglaries. 
Joan C. Watt and James C. Bradshaw, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appel-
knt 
R. Paul Van Dam and Kris C. Leonard, 
$alt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 




Todd Allen Parker appeals his convic-
tions of three counts of burglary of s 
dwelling, a second degree felony, in viola-
tion of Utah Code Ann. J 76-6-202 (1990). 
We reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
On the night of September 5 and the 
*arly morning hours of September 6,1990, 
three garages in and around a West Jordan 
%nbdiviaioD in Salt lake County wan bur 
flarized. In response to a dispatch call, 
I)eputy Wayne Dial drove to the home of 
One of the victims, Sharon Gamboa. Mrs. 
<4amboa informed him that she had beerf 
•omeone in the garage and, upon investiga-
tion, discovered that some items had been 
*emoved from the vehicles therein. IV 
Ontaide door to the garage was sjar, a 
*ereen had been cut from one of the garsp 
•Windows, and the window had been opened. 
Ifrt. Gamboa then described two men 
%hom she had seen immediately thereafter 
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reasonable remedy under the circumstance* was to grant a Judgment 
of Acquittal. Therefore, since the Judgment of Acquittal was based 
on a factual determination of Insufficiency of the evidence by 
Judge Ru8Son, Appellee has once been placed in jeopardy under both 
the Utah and United States Constitutions. Therefore, as the 
Supreme Court stated in Musselman, supra this brief p. 15, any 
opinion this Court renders in regard to this case would be an 
advisory opinion which is beyond this Court's power* See also 
State v. Overson, 489 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1971). 
As an interesting footnote to this point, the Court should be 
aware of the fact that Judge Russon stated on the record that had 
he not arrested judgment in this case and granted Judgment of 
Acquittal, he would have ordered a new trial: 
"• • « (Z)f my ruling had been otherwise, Z 
would have granted a new trial because Z don't 
think the instruction clearly outlined that 
intent as is necessary in the element instruc-
tions a Z think you can do something with a 
purpose, but Z am not sure that that consti-
tutes intent as required by the statute and 
defined earlier in the statute of a specific 
intent to deprive* • •" 
(R. 1619 p.110). 
Therefore, if this Court remands this ease, the proper remedy 
is not to reinstate the jury verdict, but to remand the ease for 
further proceedings consistent with this Court9s opinion. If such 
further proceedings are allowed by this Court in the lower court, 
then it is presumed Judge Russon (or his successor) will enter an 
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order granting the Appellee a new trial based upon Judge Russon's 
comments outlined above. 
Therefore, this clearly becomes s caae where a defendant would 
be required to be retried despite the fact that a Judgment of 
Acquittal had been entered after his first trial based upon the 
insufficiency of the evidence. Such e result simply cannot be 
tolerated under our constitutional system of justice for the 
reasons stated herein, and Appellee respectfully requests that the 
prosecution's appeal be dismissed. 
POINT H I 
THE FACTS PROVEN AT TRIAL DO WOT CONSTITUTE A 
PUBLIC OFFENSE. 
Even if this Court were to find that Appellant has a right to 
appeal the trial court's Judgment of Acquittal, and that jeopardy 
did not attach when the Judgment of Acquittal was entered, Appellee 
argues that Judge Russon's determination that the facts proven at 
trial did not constitute s public offense should be upheld and 
affirmed by this Court. 
To fully understand the reasons why Judge Russon entered not 
only an arrest of judgment but also s Judgment of Acquittal in the 
instant case, it is necessary to review his comments in open court 
at the time of the hearing on Appellee's Motions. Judge Russon 
stated: 
"THE COURT: X guess, I was on the trial 
bench for about six and s half, closing in on 
ssven years, and of all the criminal cases I 
hsvs handled, of course, this particular issue 
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Z think has given us the greatest difficulty. 
We livs in s commercial world of contracts. 
We have breach of contract daily. Lawsuits 
galore. Partners suing partners, limited 
partners suing general partners. Shareholders 
of corporations suing shareholders. Creditors 
suing both. And we cone with this particular 
case that has been argued at great length all 
through the trial and here and, Z suppose, 
because it is so unusual. 
Z don't suppose, Mr. Parrish, you have found 
a case. Z think Z asked you during the trial. 
You have any case anyplace in the United 
States with similar facts that indicate that 
constituted theft? At that time, you didn't, 
but do you have any today? 
MR. PARRISH: No, Z didn't in our pleadings, 
but we still haven*t found a case that is 
exactly in point. 
THE COURT: Zt is that unusual. Zf it is that 
difficult for us, the interpretation of this 
agreement and the law, then the question 
comes: Can there be any evidence under the 
instructions that a jury can find one guilty 
of theft beyond a reasonable doubt? We have 
so many problems ourselves In dealing with 
this issue, and probably it hasn't been ruled 
on anyplace in the United - there is no ruling 
we know of anyplace in the United States. And 
it gives us great difficulty. 
Probably the reason we have no cases presented 
here of any authority of this constituting a 
crime is because it is always through civilly 
(sic)• But the State in this case chose to 
treat it as a theft and Z have agonised over 
it myself« • » 
(Ra 1619 pp. 104-106). 
Z believe that this is a civil matter. Z 
think that the argument that has been made is 
basically set to rest by State vs. Burton. 
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That the facts are somewhat similar. That 
this is really basically a civil matter. 
X don't condone what has been done. I have 
already given Mr. Larsen my lecture when I 
sentenced him on the Securities Fraud. I 
still feel that way. Z feel what was done 
here was a very bad thing, destructive on 
people, that's morally wrong. But the remedy 
that exists exists in the civil courts for 
fraud and for civil action, and that what has 
gone on here does not constitute theft. Z 
think that is the reason we do not find a case 
anyplace in this United States, or all 50 
states and all the Supreme Courts and Courts 
of Appeal and Federal Courts of Appeal. There 
is not one case that can be brought here to 
show that these particular facts can consti-
tute theft, and I don't believe that they 
constitute theft in this particular case. So 
I therefore grant the motion in arrest of 
judgment. . •" (Emphasis added). 
(R. 1619 pp. 109, 110). 
Appellant argues in its brief that: 
"• . « In short, the Court did not identify 
any statutory element of theft which was not 
established by the facts proved at trial, and 
essentially held that, under Utahvs theft 
statute, the general partner in a limited 
partnership cannot be guilty of stealing 
partnership property. The Court obviously 
believed that the sole remedy for misappropri-
ation of partnership property by a general 
partner lies in the civil arena. This legal 
conclusion is erroneous." 
Appellant's Opening Brief at 11, 12. 
This assumption by Appellant is absolutely false and is not 
based on anything stated by the Judge nor ruled upon by the Court 
In any way. The Court at no time held that a general partner in 
a limited partnership cannot be guilty of stealing partnership 
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property. What Appall ant haa dona hara la to eraata a "at raw man" 
and than apand aavaral pages in Ita briaf knocking down tha "straw 
nan" in an affort to convince tha Court that tha Judge drew an 
erroneous legal coneluaion. Thia is abaolutely false! Appellee 
challenges Appellant to cite one place in the record where the 
Court makes such a ruling or statement. Appellee respectfully 
requests that this Honorable Court during oral argument ask 
Appellant for a citation to the record on this point. Appellee 
submits that Appellant cannot oblige and is merely making an 
assumption baaed upon pure speculation. In fact, the aesumption 
is wrong! 
The Amended Information in the instant caae charges Appellee 
with exercising ". . . unauthorized control over the property of 
John Chamberlain, Ned Gregerson, Robert Nelson, or Neal Mortens en, 
with the purpose to deprive them thereof •" (R. 1863). Appellee may 
agree with Appellant that Utah law is such that an individual may 
be convicted of stealing partnership property, but Appellee in the 
instant case was accueed of stealing the property of individual 
limited partners and not the property of the partnerehip. The name 
of the partnership was Three Crowns Limited. Appellant choee to 
go to jury trial with an allegation that the property of the 
individual partnere had been the subject of a theft; mo the "straw 
man" created by Appellant in ita brief simply does not exist! 
The Judge seemed to accept the argument advanced by Appellee 
in hie Motion in Arrest of Judgment or in the Alternative for New 
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Trial. That argument was to the effect that it la very clear that 
If the alleged limited partner victims in the Instant case had a 
grievance with the manner in which the Appellee handled the funds 
from the sale of the mobile home park in Las Vegas, they had the 
same right that any creditor of the limited partnership would have 
under Utah law to bring a civil action against the general partner. 
Utah Code Ann. S 48-2a-606 provides: *(A)t the time a partner 
becomes entitled to receive a distribution, he has the status of, 
and is entitled to all remedies available to, a creditor of the 
limited partnership with respect to the distribution". This 
section seems to make clear that a limited partner in Utah does not 
own the partnership property, but merely possesses an Interest in 
the nature of the interest of any creditor, in a distribution of 
the ultimate proceeds of the partnership. 
As stated earlier, the property the limited partners in the 
instant case were allegedly deprived of, a portion of the 
$838,000.00 proceeds from the sale of a mobile home park in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, was property of the partnership itself, and not the 
property of the individual partners. Therefore, Appellant's 
evidence at trial failed to prove the allegation in the Amended 
Information, i.e. that the property of individuals was "stolen1' 
from those individuals. 
This argument becomes particularly significant when it is 
noted that in paragraph 2.2 of the Certificate and Agreement of 
Limited Partnership for Three Crowns Limited, (Trial Exhibit P-l 
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•ttached as Add. 2), the partnership was givan tha authority to 
"engage In or posseas any interest in other ventures which may or 
may not have similar business purposes as those set forth. . •" 
Further, paragraphs 8.1 and 8.2 clearly indicate that distribution 
of any partnership assets or proceeds was "• • • subject to 
maintaining the Partnership in a sound financial and cash posi-
tion. . .". Such distributions of cash or other property would be 
made to the limited partners only when " . . . the General Partner, 
in his absolute discretion, determines (such) is not needed in the 
operation (of the partnership), but any distribution will be made 
only if, in the absolute judgment and discretion of the General 
Partner, it will not in any way jeopardize or limit the bualness 
of the Partnership." (Emphaala added). 
Furthermore, the Partnership Agreement provides in Section 
15.1 that "(T)he General Partner shall be solely responsible for 
the management of the Partnership business with all rights and 
powers generally conferred by law or necessary, advisable or 
consistent in connection therewith." 
In addition, to the foregoing, the Partnership Agreement in 
Section 15.2(F) provides that among the rights and powers to be 
bald exclusively by the General Partner would be the power to 
•(S)ell all or substantially all of tha assets of the Limited 
Partnership without tha consent of tha Limited Partners". The 
General Partner, upon termination and dissolution of the partner-
•kip, la given the power under paragraph 21.1(C) to terminate and 
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dissolve the partnership upon "(S)ale of all properties acquired 
by the partnership If the General Partner In its sole discretion 
determines there Is not a compelling reason to continue the 
Partnership.* Also, Section 23*3 provides for a power of attorney 
granted by the limited partner to the General Partner concurrently 
with the execution of the Partnership Agreement to ". . . take any 
further action which said attorney shall consider necessary or 
convenient In connection with any of the foregoing hereby giving 
said attorney full power and authority to do and perform each and 
every act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done 
In and about the foregoing as fully as said limited partner might 
or could do If personally present, and hereby ratifying and 
confirming all that said attorney shall lawfully do or cause to be 
done by virtue hereof." 
The Subscription Agreement of each of the named Individuals 
In the Amended Information was produced at trial (Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 and 11); and each of them did in fact 
provide through those Subscription Agreements the power of attorney 
referred to in Section 23.3 of the Partnership Agreement* 
It should therefore be readily seen by this Court that 
pursuant to Utah law, a limited partner simply stands In the shoes 
of a normal creditor with regard to any distributions he feels he 
Is entitled to receive at any time. Glvan the discretionary powers 
granted to the General Partner outlined above, and the fact that 
no limited partner had an ownership Interest In the proceeds of the 
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sale of the mobile hone park in the Las Vegas, Appellant utterly 
and completely failed to prove that Appellee obtained or exercised 
unauthorised control over the property of John Chamberlain, Ned 
Gregerson, Robert Nelson, Neal Mortensen, and others with the 
purpose to deprive them thereof, as alleged in the Amended Informa-
tion. 
In its opening brief, Appellant argues in a footnote that 
"(T)he trial court Incorrectly relied on State v. Burton, 800 P.2d 
817 (Utah App. 1990) (Add. 4), in reaching its conclusion that only 
civil liability could arise under the facts of Defendant's case. 
. ." Appellant's Opening Brief at page 17. 
It is interesting that this footnote is the only place where 
Appellant in its brief mentions the State v. Burton case. Appel-
lant goes on to allege in its opening brief ". . .(U)nlike the 
instant case, there was some question whether Burton exercised 
'unauthorized control over the property of another,' and further-
more, the State's novel theory of criminal liability was not 
supported by 'firm logic' or 'some basis, even if tangential, in 
established precedent'". Appellant's analysis of the Burton case 
as applied by Judge Russon is inaccurate in several respects, and 
certainly incomplete. 
State v. Burton, supra, stands for the very clear proposition 
that where the State advances a unique or novel theory of criminal 
liability in what normally would be a civil business situation, 
the appellate courts will require the prosecution to meet the 
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"Incumbent burden of sound reasoning end persuasive authority" In 
order to heve a guilty verdict upheld. In that case, defendant 
Burton attempted to sell a home to one Waldron. The home In 
question was encumbered by tiro trust deeds, with the first trust 
deed containing a "due on sale" clause, barring assumption of the 
note obligation by any subsequent purchaser. 
Waldron was unable to obtain financing through the note holder 
with the "due on sale" clause, so he entered Into a private 
financing agreement with Burton. Waldron was to make monthly 
payments to Burton, who would then make the mortgage payment to the 
holder of the trust deed with the "due on sale" clause; and It 
would not be reported to the holder of the "due on sale" cleuse 
that the home had been sold to another without the Bank's permis-
sion. 
Although it was understood that Burton was to take the 
payments Waldron made to him and make the mortgage payments to the 
Bank, such was not explicit In the agreement between the parties. 
Subsequently, Burton obtained the monthly payments from Waldron, 
but failed to make the payments to the Bank, resulting in the 
Bank's ultimate foreclosure on the property. The State of Utah 
brought theft charges against Burton, claiming that his failure to 
apply the payments he received from Waldron to the Bank constituted 
the crime of theft. 
In analysing the ease for the Court of Appeals, Judge Orme 
observed: 
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"Tha stata advancaa a unlqua thaory of 
criminal liability In this casa. Zt is quits 
tailing that naithar aids has praaantad tha 
court with any dacision validating or preclud-
ing tha criminal prosacution of what is sssen-
tially a braach of a raal astata sala agree-
ment. Ha are not unreceptive to novel theo-
ries of law whan they are supported by firm 
logic and hava soma basis, avan if tangential, 
in established precedent. However, the mora 
unique the innovation, tha greater will ba the 
incumbent burden of sound of reasoning and 
persuasive authority. Such reasoning and 
authority are notably absent in this case. 
Zn that posture we are loathe to give ap-
proval to tha broad construction of Section 
76-6-404 (the theft statute) urged upon us by 
the state. Were we to do so, it lm likely 
that memorials of commercial transactions 
would soon be drafted to Include boilerplate 
language designed to Impose criminal liability 
for interruptions in the stream of payments — 
a circumstance which would normally be noth-
ing more than a braach of contract, tradi-
tionally viewed as adequately remedied through 
an action of law". (Emphasis added). 
800 P.2d 817, 819. 
Appellee would bring tha Court's attention to tha Statement 
of Facts at the beginning of this brief. Zt can raadlly ba seen 
from these facts that what was Involved in tha Instant ease was a 
normal civil situation which waa enforceable by limited partnars 
through an action at law. This was the vary situation Judge Orme 
indicated should ba handled civilly and not criminally in Stata v. 
Burton, supra. 
Although U.C.A. S 48-2a-606 of tha Utah Llmltad Partnership 
Act providing that s limited partner has tha status of those 
entitled to the remedies of a creditor with respect to a distribu-
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tion from the partnership, did not become effective until 1990, 
Appellee maintains that the entire scheme of the Utah Limited 
Partnership Act prior to (as well as subsequent to) its amendment 
has been to provide that a limited partner, at the time he becomes 
entitled to receive a distribution, has all the remedies available 
to a creditor of the limited partnership with respect to the 
distribution. The specific enactment of U.C.A. S 48-2a-606, 
effective in 1990, merely codified and clarified that philosophy, 
which has permeated the entire Utah Limited Partnership Act from 
its inception. 
In addition, U.C.A. S 48-2-22 (1953), in effect at the time 
of the alleged theft in this case, provided that a creditor of a 
limited partner may charge only the interest of the indebted 
limited partner with payment of any unsatisfied claim. Subsection 
2 of that statute specifically stated: "The interest may be 
redeemed with the separate property of any general partner, but may 
not be redeemed with partnership property." This statute estab-
lished clearly that a limited partner had no right to, nor Interest 
in specific partnership property even prior to the enactment of the 
new oode provision in 1990. 
What seems very clear Is that Appellant's prosecution of the 
Instant theft case Is Indeed a unique effort on its part to create 
a criminal situation out of "a circumstance which would normally 
be nothing more than a breach of contract, traditionally viewed as 
34 
adequately remedied through an action of law." State v. Burton, 
supra at 819. 
Although challenged to do so by Judge Russon during the course 
of arguments regarding Appellee's motion to dismiss on the basis 
herein discussed, Appellant was unable to present a single case in 
which the instant type of fact situation had resulted in a criminal 
offense. Appellant was forced to admit that there was no appellate 
court precedent for its prosecution, although it claimed that the 
conduct of Appellee met the legal requirements of the theft 
statute. Zt was just this kind of effort by Appellant to expand 
a normal civil breach of contract situation into a criminal theft 
that resulted in the reversal of Burton's jury conviction in State 
v. Burton, supra. Mad the limited partners felt aggrieved as a 
result of the methods in which Appellee had loaned the funds of the 
partnership during the interim period prior to distribution, they 
would have had, and still have, the right to file a civil lawsuit 
against Appellee and perhaps obtain a judgment. Their civil 
lawsuit would be based upon an allegation of the Appellee's breach 
of contract, i.e., alleged breach of the provisions of the Certifi-
cate of Agreement of Limited Partnership to which the limited 
partners subscribed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee maintains that Appellant has no right to appeal the 
Court's Judgment of Acquittal In the instant matter and the appeal 
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DEC 1 9 1990 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
C. DEAN LARSEN, 
Defendant. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CRIMINAL NO. 891900927 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant C. DEAN LARSEN is 
charged by the Information which has been duly filed vith the 
commission of THEFT The Information alleges: 
THEFT, a Second Degree Felony. On or about October 10, 
1986, in Salt Lake County, Utah, and in violation of Utah Code 
Ann., Section 76-6-404, the defendant, C. DEAN LARSEN, did obtain 
or exercise unauthorized control over the property of John 
Chamberlain, Ned Gregerson, Robert Nelson, Neal Mortensen, and 
others vith a purpose to deprive them thereof. The value of said 
property was in excess of $1,000.00, a second degree felony. 
0C1FM3 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
In every crime or public offense there must be a union 
or joint operation of act and intent. The intent or mental state 
with which a person acts is manifested by the circumstances 
connected with the offense and the conduct of that person in 
relation to the offense. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
The intent or state of mind of a person who engages in 
conduct is rarely provable by direct evidence. The intent or 
purpose to deprive which is an element of the offense of Theft 
may be inferred from the Defendant's acts, conduct and statements 
or other circumstantial evidence which you find relates to 
whether or not he acted with the purpose to deprive the owners of 
their property. 
> r± i'-% -«. ^  
INSTRUCTION NO. ' 
Ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the culpable 
mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime. 
0C1P57 
INSTRUCTION NO. * ° 
Under our system of laws Individuals are not punished 
criminally for mere mistakes, mere mismanagement, mere 
carelessness, or mere errors of judgment. They are punished only 
for intentional wrongdoing. The Defendant here Is not on trial for 
errors of judgment or mistakes or mismanagement, but Is on trial 
for a criminal offense. 
WIFZQ 
INSTRUCTION NO, H 
You are instructed that under the laws of the State of Utah, 
the following words have the following meanings: 
1. "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about 
a transfer of possession or of some other legally recognized 
interest in property, whether to the obtainer or to another. 
2. "Property" means anything of value and includes such 
personal property as money and such intangible property as an 
interest in or right to obtain money. 
3. "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" includes 
conduct where one who has been entrusted with the property of 
another converts that property to his own use without authority 
to do so. 
4. "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious 
object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so 
extended a period or to use under such circumstances that a 
substantial portion of its economic value, or the use and benefit 
thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To dispose of the property under circumstances 
that make it unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
ooi^rs 
INSTRUCTION NO. '*' 
In order to convict the defendant of the charged offense, 
you must find that he exercised unauthorized control over the 
property of another while acting with the specific intent or 
purpose to deprive the other person of his/her property, as 
defined in these instructions. It is not necessary that you find 
that the Defendant formed such specific intent or purpose to 
deprive at the time that he first obtained control over the 
property of another, but such purpose to deprive may be found at 
any period of time in which the defendant exercised unauthorized 
control over such property. 
INSTRUCTION NO. _f_y 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of THEFT, 
as alleged in the Information, you must find from the evidence, 
beyond a reasonable doubt,/allyof the following elements of that ;,/ )< 
crime: 
1. That the Defendant exercised unauthorised control; 
2. Over the property of John Chamberlain, Ned Gregerson, 
/ 
Robert Nelson, or Neal Mortensen; 
3. With a purpose to deprive them thereof; 
4. On or about October 10, 1986; 
5. In Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
6. and, that the value of said property exceeded $1,000.00. 
If ycu believe that the evidence establishes each and all of 
the foregoing ele^nts .J>eyond-^ a^ rje.^ sonable doubt, it is your duty 
to find the defendant guilty of THEFT. 
On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to establish 
one or more of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, 
it is your duty to find the defendant not guilty of fTHEFT.\ 
-I-
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Tou are instructed that it is not a defense to Theft that 
the actor engaged in the conduct which constitutes the offense 
with the intent of restoring the property to the owner at some 
future time or through other funds or property. If you find that 
the Defendant obtained or exercised unauthorised control over the 
property of another or others and acted with the purpose to 
deprive them of their property, the offense was complete at that 
time and the Defendant's intent to later repay the money or even 
his actual repayment is not a defense to Theft. 
ADDENDUM F 
INSTRUCTION NO. K. 
Before you can find the defendant, C. Dean Larsen, guilty of 
the crime of "SECURITIES FRAUD" as alleged in Count One (1) of 
the Information, you must find from the evidence all of the 
following elements of the crime: 
1. That on or about January 7, 1986, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the defendant, C. Dean Larsen; 
2. In connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any 
security; 
3. Willfully made; 
4. To Carlos Flamand; 
5. Directly or Indirectly; 
6. An untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every 
one of the above elements of the crime of securities fraud, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be your dutyAfind the 
defendant guilty as to Count One (1) of the information. On the 
one or mc 
i,/lit shi 
other hand, if the evidence has failed to estfblisfi ^ore r J ^ 
of the above elements of the offense charges/>i all be your 
duty to find the defendant not guilty of the crime charged in 
Count One (1). hP 
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1 I THE COURT: Call your next witness. 
2 I MR. GRIFFIN: The State calls John C. Baldwin. 
3 .TOHN nrnarev BAT.DWTN 
4 I Called as a witness on behalf of the State, after having 
5 I been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
6 I follows: 
7 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
6 BY MR. GRIFFIN: 
9 I Q Good afternoon, Mr. Baldwin. Would you please 
10 I state your full name for the record and spell your last 
11 I name. 
12 I A Yes. John Cheney Baldwin, B-a-1-d-w-i-n. 
13 I Q Where do you live? 
14 A 1527 Princeton Avenue. 
15 Q And what do you do for a living? 
16 I A I am currently the executive director of the 
17 I Utah Bar Association. 
18 I Q Are you a lawyer? 
19 I A Yes, sir. 
20 I Q How long have you been a lawyer? 
21 I A For ten years. 
22 I Q Would you briefly describe for the Jury your 
23 I employment history? 
24 I A Sure. I have been the executive director of 
25 I the Bar since September of this year. For five years 
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1 I previous to that I was the director of the Utah 
2 J Securities Division. For three years previous to that I 
3 I was an assistant Utah Attorney General, and for two years 
4 J previous to that I was in private practice. 
5 I Q When you were at the Attorney General's Office, 
6 I who did you represent? 
7 I A For two of the years I represented the 
8 I Securities Division and for one of those years I 
9 I represented various departments of state government. 
10 Q Can you describe for the jury very briefly what 
11 I the Utah Securities Division does? 
12 A Briefly, it takes care of enforcing a specific 
13 I section of the Utah Code known as the Utah Uniform 
14 I Securities Act which generally does three things. It 
15 I registers, which means approves, certain sales of 
16 I securities or offers of sales of securities before they 
17 I are to be sold in the state, unless those securities are 
18 exempt otherwise from sale. It licenses the people that 
19 I sell the securities or give advice regarding securities 
20 I and, thirdly, it investigates complaints of fraud 
21 I Involving the offer and sale of securities. 
22 I Q Are you familiar with a company known as 
23 I Granada, Inc.? 
24 I A Yes, sir. 
25 I Q Are you familiar with the defendant Dean 
109 
Larsen? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q How did you come to know of Granada, Inc.? 
MR. KELLER: Your Honor, at this time may 
counsel approach the bench? 
THE COURT: You may. 
(Off the record discussion between Court and 
counsel.) 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Baldwin, I believe my 
question was, how did you come to know the entity known 
as Granada, Inc.? 
A What I recall, the early part of 1985 when I 
was in the Attorney General's Office, I was asked to sit 
in with another Assistant Utah Attorney General who was 
discussing with a friend of his concerns about Granada. 
Apparently this friend of his had worked for Granada. 
MR. KELLER: I would object at this point, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Baldwin, subsequent to 
1965, do you know if Granada had dealings with the Utah 
Securities Division? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And what were those dealings concerning? 
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A At a certain point in time on behalf of the 
division when I was there, we sat down with lawyers 
representing Granada in order to resolve complaints that 
had been filed with our office regarding the operations. 
Q And can you give us some idea of the nature of 
those complaints? 
MR. KELLER: Objection, irrelevant and 
immaterial to the issue before the Court. 
MR. GRIFFIN: Can we approach the bench, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: You may. 
(Off the record discussion between Court and 
counsel.) 
THE COURT: Restate your question. 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Baldwin, do you recall 
that one of the issues that you were looking at or the 
division was looking at was the sale of unregistered 
securities? 
A Yes, that is correct. 
Q Do you recall how that was related to Granada? 
Can you explain that a little? 
h Well» there was, to my recollection, several 
entities which I would recall are satellites around 
Granada. That Granada was an operation in which money 
was going. There were other entities in which money was 
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1 I coming and going, and that collectively we will refer to 
2 f that group BB Granada because that essentially was the 
3 I mother ship. We were again concerned that certain of 
4 I these sales of promissory notes, securities, other types 
5 I of instruments constituted unregistered securities which 
6 I had not been registered and that was the basis of the 
7 I discussions that we had with Granada. 
6 I Q Can you recall the magnitude of the amount of 
9 I money that was invested in these unregistered securities? 
10 MR. KELLER: Objection. I think there is an 
11 I improper foundation for that, Your Honor. He is asking 
12 I the vltneee to recollect something from his memory that 
13 I is specific, and I think it is inappropriate. 
14 I THE COURT: That can be answered yes or no, if 
15 I he knows. 
16 I Q (By Mr. Griffin) Do you recall the amounts of 
17 I money that were involved in the division's Investigation? 
18 I A It was millions of dollars. My recollection 
19 I is, as well as that, in order to reconcile the 
20 I negotiations and to provide an offering statement to our 
21 I satisfaction to keep the operation ongoing, that 
22 I collectively was $15 million. 
23 I Q You mentioned an offering statement. Let's 
24 I take it back even further than that. You had testified 
25 I that you talked to attorneys who represented Granada. 
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1 I A That ie correct. 
2 I Q What were you negotiating? 
3 I A Originally, we were negotiating the very 
4 I element of whether or not what they were selling was 
5 I securities. We indicated to them that it was our 
6 I contention that they were securities and, of course, it 
7 I was theirs that it was not at that point in time. We 
8 I then reached the point in those discussions when we 
9 I resolved that — 
10 I Q Let me stop you there for a minute. When the 
11 I division was investigating this case, did you have some 
12 I concerns beyond the fact that the securities were simply 
13 I not registered? 
14 I MR. KELLER: Objection, irrelevant and 
15 I immaterial, Your Honor. 
16 I THE COURT: Sustained. 
17 I Q (By Mr. Griffin) What are the types of things 
18 I that you would be concerned about in that situation? 
19 I A Well, the allegations that had come to our 
20 I attention were not only that there was unregistration of 
21 I securities —-
22 I MR. KELLER: Objection. 
23 I THE COURT: Let lie have you come back to the 
24 I bench a moment. In fact, ladles and gentlemen, I think I 
25 I will have you taken to the Jury room for a breather. I 
113 
1 I have a little legal matter I want to clear up here. 
2 I (Jury left the courtroom.) 
3 I The record will show the Jury has left the 
4 I courtroom. What is the relevance of all of this? We are 
5 I here now. We tried 18 counts of Securities Fraud. Now 
6 I we are here on a theft charge. What relevance does this 
7 I have? 
8 I MR. GRIFFIN: Your Honor* we believe that the 
9 I evidence will show that the money from the theft was used 
10 I to fund an escrow account for an entity known as Utah 
11 Mortgage Fund, which was a limited offering. That the 
12 I defendant took the proceeds from the sale of Three Crowns 
13 I and deposited them in a bank. $500,000 to be exact. 
14 I Deposited them in a bank to be held against a recision 
15 I offering, which means that the defendant wanted to sell 
16 I new investments. The Securities Division was registering 
17 I that offering. They would not allow that offering to go 
18 I forward, a $15 million offering of new Investor money to 
19 I go forward without sufficient capital in Granada, which 
20 I they knew was scrapped for cash at the time, and they 
21 I wouldn't allow it to go forward without a guarantee of 
22 I $500,000. The defendant provided that by appropriating 
23 I the Three Crowns' proceeds. 
24 I Mow, what I am trying to get at with this last 
25 I question with Mr. Baldwin is that the division was 
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1 I concerned with disclosures to investors. 
2 I THE COURT: Now, what relevance does it have? 
3 I He either took the money and misappropriated the money, 
4 J embezzled the money, whatever you want, he either did it 
5 I or didn't. Regardless of where it went or what he did 
6 I with-it. Whether he bought land in Switzerland or Just 
7 I put it back into other entities of his own, what 
8 I relevance does any of that have to that? 
9 I MR. GRIFFIN: It absolutely goes to his intent. 
10 I Granada is scrapped for cash and what is going to come in 
11 I at the Dussex Monument is this new offering of $15 
12 I million. The $500,000 is deposited in the escrow. In 
13 I addition to that, we keep on hearing Mr. Keller accuse 
14 I the State of putting Granada into bankruptcy. The Jury 
15 I is entitled to know why the State did that. 
16 I MR. KELLER: Your Honor, with regard to the 
17 I Utah Mortgage Fund offering, it does not have any 
18 I relevance to the issue before the Court, which is the 
19 I question of the misappropriation or misuse of funds of 
20 I Three Crowns. 
21 I How, when we get into the accountant's money, 
22 I we will see that funds from the Three Crowns' sale were 
23 I deposited in the Three Crowns' account. Checks written 
24 I to the Granada Interoffice Account and then through a 
25 I series of tracings, the accountant will attempt to trace 
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it through is Utah Mortgage Fund, plus numerous other 
accounts. The fact is if the money was misappropriated, 
it was misappropriated initially. Where they can trace 
the money to over the next several months is immaterial, 
and we will object to that. This is merely one account 
of several that they have attempted to trace the monies 
to and they have elaborate charts to show how they are 
tracing those monies. But our position is that is not 
appropriate. It is not relevant. It shouldn't be 
allowed in as evidence. 
In addition to that, the kinds of questions 
counsel is now asking of this witness, the witness is 
answering to the best of his ability but there was a lot 
going on with Granada that did not involve the transfer 
of funds from the Three Crowns Limited Partnership into 
the Granada Interoffice Account. Just didn't involve it 
at all. And my fear is. this witness in trying to 
testify honestly about the situation, is required to get 
into things by virtue of the questions counsel asked. 
When he asked specific leading questions that directed 
his attention to one sort or another, then I didn't have 
a problem. But these general kinds of questions are 
really a problem for us. 
So we have an objection as to grounds of 
relevancy in general and, secondly* an objection to the 
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specific questions as to the relevancy and to opening up 
Information from the witness that Is not relevant for 
this Jury to consider and Is prejudicial to my client. 
I would suggest, Your Honor• that even if the 
Court finds it has some probative value, whatever 
probative value that it has, it is so limited that it is 
over-shadowed by the prejudicial effect of the evidence. 
And tinder Rule 403 this Court does have the discretion to 
exclude it, and we would request as an additional ground 
that it be excluded on that basis. 
THE COURT: Mr. Griffin. 
MR. GRIFFIN: Your Honor, it has relevance to 
the bankruptcy. It has relevance to the defendant's 
state of mind at the time and its absolute relevance to 
intent. 
You will recall that Merrill Rasmussen 
testified that the defendant told him around the same 
period of time that the money was being held at Citibank. 
Well, Utah Mortgage Fund will be shown to be an account 
at Citibank. It is absolutely relevant, Your Honor. I 
am trying to get into an area where we simply lead into 
the negotiations of the filing of Utah Mortgage Fund. 
I appreciate that Mr. Keller might want to 
contend that, but that doesn't mean that the State's 
theory is wrong and the State is entitled to present its 
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1 I case. 
2 I THE COURT: I am going to allow you to proceed. 
3 I We have to remember, however, the charges involved. 
4 I Really basically, the Nevada property and what went on 
5 I here and we can't drift off into a lot of other things, 
6 I except where it is purely relevant to the issues at hand. 
7 I So I will admonish you to keep it that way, even if you 
8 I have to ask some leading questions. I think we discussed 
9 I that at the bench. I don't want these big broad 
10 J questions. A preliminary — You can ask preliminary 
11 I questions that are quite narrow, but we make sure we keep 
12 I on the track so we don't get too far afield. 
13 MR. GRIFFIN: That involves a substantial shift 
14 I in my thinking, but I will try to do that with some 
15 I latitude. 
16 I THE COURT: I don't want us to go off on a 
17 I tangent. We want to keep this within the issues of this 
18 I particular case before the Court. 
19 I While we have Mr. Baldwin here without the 
20 I Jury, his father is Judge Baldwin, right? 
21 THE WITNESS: That is right. 
22 I THE COURT: And this was Judge Baldwin's 
23 I courtroom for many, many, many years. My kids always get 
24 I confused which courtroom I am in; but, John, I think you 
25 I probably remember that. This was his courtroom. I 
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1 I thought that would add a little interest to all of us 
2 I here. And not only that, I was in Ernest Baldwin's law 
3 J firm for years before he went on the bench. But anyway, 
4 I we are ready to proceed and is there anything else you 
5 I need to bring up? 
6 MR. GRIFFIN: Nothing else at this time, Your 
7 J Honor. 
B I THE COURT: Bring the dury back in. (Pause) 
9 I The Jury has returned and we are ready to move 
10 I ahead. You may ask your next question. 
11 Q (By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Baldwin, are you familiar 
12 I with the securities offering known as Utah Mortgage Fund? 
13 A Yes. 
14 I Q How did you become familiar with Utah Mortgage 
15 Fund? 
16 I A It was filed with our office in order to allow 
17 I the sales of securities that were to go into that 
IB I offering. 
19 I Q Do you remember any of the specific features of 
20 this offering? 
21 I A It was Intended to do two things. To provide 
22 J money for this large financial organization to be able to 
23 I have the proceeds to continue to do business in their 
24 I areas. And it was to provide disclosure to investors who 
25 I had currently given money to various of the entities in 
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order to give them a chance to take their money out if 
they no longer wanted to stay involved in the operation, 
given what we perceived to be disclosures that they would 
not have otherwise had. And to provide funds for them to 
essentially get money back that they had once given. 
Q Were there questions about the ability of 
Granada to repay? 
A It's my recollection at the time we were aware 
that ~ 
MR. KELLER: Objection. The question can be 
answered yes or no, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: It can be answered yes or no. 
THE WITNESS: Please restate the question. 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) Were there questions with the 
division about Granada's ability to repay former 
investors? 
A Yes. 
Q Did the division attempt to resolve its 
concerns in that regard? 
A Yes. 
Q How did the division attempt to resolve its 
concerns in that regard? 
A We required In the offering that there be a 
certain amount of cash. 
Q How much? 
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A Half a million dollars Is my recollection: 
Q That there be a certain amount of cash and I am 
sorry, I cut you off to get the amount. 
A A certain amount of cash to go towards 
resolving the cash needs of the people who would want to 
get their money back. 
Q And how was that money to be held? 
A It was to be held In an escrow account to 
satisfy the residual offers. 
Q Do you know If the defendant was connected with 
this Utah Mortgage Fund? 
A It Is my recollection that his name appeared as 
the filer of the documents. 
Q Mr. Baldwin, do you know If there ever was an 
escrow of $500,000? 
A I don't know that. 
Q What happened to the Utah Mortgage Fund 
offering that was filed with the division? 
A The offering was filed and It was never 
approved for what we call "registration." 
Q So was Granada able to sell that offering to 
Investors? 
A Well, the offering Itself was not approved by 
the State to be sold to investors. 
Q Can you tell the Jury why it was not approved? 
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MR. KELLER: Objection. Your Honor, again, 
irrelevant and immaterial to the subject before the Court 
at this time. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Baldwin, after the Utah 
Mortgage Fund was not approved by the Securities 
Division, what further contacts, if any, did the division 
have with Granada, Inc.? 
A We had contact with lawyers representing 
Granada and the Utah Mortgage Fund and this family of 
financial entities that we had involvement in. There 
were numerous discussions with them in which time we 
resolved that. It was our opinion that the offering 
would not go effective but could not go effective, and 
essentially we indicated that to the lawyers representing 
the companies. 
Q Were there contacts after that? 
A Yes, there were. We were approached by a 
second group of lawyers on behalf of the financial 
operations indicating a renewed willingness on their part 
to reconcile the collection of money, the registration 
and to work out what they had tried to work out over the 
past few years. 
Q And were those subsequent conversations 
successful at reaching some sort of amicable conclusion? 
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A No. We felt that given the time — 
MR. KELLER: Objection, the question has been 
answered no. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) What happened after that? 
What happened when the Securities Division couldn't reach 
cm agreement with Granada? 
A We indicated ~ My understanding, Granada took 
out bankruptcy. 
MR. GRIFFIN: Thank you very much. 
THE COURT: You may cross examine. 
MR. KELLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KELLER: 
Q Good afternoon, Mr. Baldwin. 
A Hi. 
Q Mr. Baldwin, were you present at a meeting in 
early January of 1987 when several officers of Granada, 
Including Mr. Larsen, were present? 
A I remember there was at least one meeting in 
which several officers of Granada came to our offices. I 
don't recall when that was, but it was in the course of 
trying to negotiate the offering circular. 
Q Do you recall that at that meeting Mr. Larsen, 
the defendant in this case, was present? 
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